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After mainland United States suffered a violent attack upon its citizenry, 
Homeland Security professionals recognized the need to protect a growing number of 
critical infrastructure locations.  Millions of dollars earmarked for emergency 
management programs were funneled into technologies that enabled public safety to “do 
more with less.”  Closed circuit television surveillance systems rocketed to the forefront 
as the must-have technology.  Citizens of the United States became subject to video 
surveillance during their normal daily routines. 
This thesis examines the management of CCTV systems used by municipal police 
departments and analyzes the policies created to control the technology and prevent 
abuse.  Using U.S. Census Bureau data, the police departments responsible for protecting 
the 50 largest cities were contacted and surveyed.  The initial step determined what 
jurisdictions utilized surveillance cameras to monitor public domains.  The follow-up 
steps gathered information about the systems being used; the management decisions 
regarding where to place the cameras; the training for its operators; supervision 
standards; the written policies regulating the department’s program; analyzing those 
directives; and finally, presenting step-by-step recommendations for implementing 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Technology enables government and public safety administrators to accomplish 
the number one goal of every manager—to do more with less.  Random patrols of 
geographic areas using human assets remain limited while the implementation of CCTV 
technology exponentially increases the potential patrol coverage.  The ability to monitor 
large geographic areas with minimal human resources appeals to those responsible for 
protecting society from criminal and terrorist behavior.  The danger of watching (without 
detection) public areas and the curtilage of private property lies in the awesome 
temptation for individuals employed by private and government entities to improperly 
utilize the tool of surveillance camera systems.  
In the quest to secure the homeland, technology automatically becomes a partner 
for the average beat cop.  With more than 1 million CCTV surveillance cameras presently 
in use throughout the United States, standardized controls are necessary.1  The potential 
infringement upon persons lawfully protesting, the release of images, and the ability to 
satisfy voyeuristic desires are real threats to the integrity of CCTV systems and 
organizations that use those systems. 
The success of CCTV implementation to monitor public domains in American 
cities hinges completely on public and political acceptance.  As such, the policy options 
analysis exists as the appropriate methodology to assess the most effective template for 
use by Homeland Security professionals.  An historical review has been conducted by 
examining the policies, procedures and technologies used throughout the world.  The 
comprehensive review will assist in determining the best methods available to 
accomplish the goal of protecting civil liberties and preventing abuse with CCTV 
surveillance systems.  It is imperative that homeland security professionals act 
responsibly when engaging in processes that tread very close to the line protecting civil 
liberties.  
 
1 John D. Woodward, “Privacy vs. Security: Electronic Surveillance in the Nation’s Capital,” RAND 
Corporation (CT-194 2002): 1, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/ct194/index.html [Accessed August 
2005]. 
2 
The future use of technology in homeland security efforts to protect the nation 
relies on two elements:  1) successfully defending against legal challenges, and 2) 
maintaining public support.  Without suitable preventive procedures and organizational 
acceptance of those measures, agencies utilizing CCTV surveillance cameras are likely to 
fail in preserving the elements that will allow development and implementation for the 
task of homeland security.  
The limitless possibilities presented by introducing CCTV technology to the 
urban domain will be drastically influenced by public acceptance.  Gaining community 
support leads to political sponsorship.  If the citizens of a jurisdiction are willing to 
expand the social contract and permit law enforcement to utilize this tool, then the elected 
officials of the region will be less likely to challenge the new initiative.  It is imperative 
that homeland security executives assure the public that sufficient controls are in place to 
prevent the improper use of the camera systems and recorded images.  A best practices 
template will enable administrators to prevent civil rights violations, protect the privacy 
of the general public and garner the support of both allies and critics. 
Until the people of the community can be put at ease regarding the police use of 
surveillance camera systems, the capabilities of this technology will be inhibited by 
controversy.  The support of the American public and the unspoken agreement to provide 
government with the authority to deal with the dormant possibility of infringement upon 
basic freedoms must remain intact.  The goal of this thesis lies in the desire to 
successfully control a potentially invasive technology.  Strengthening the cooperative 
relationship between public safety professionals and the public hinges on how much the 
people trust the ability of law enforcement et al to control their own operations. 
Research and formal/informal contacts identified a multitude of organizations as 
having CCTV surveillance cameras in their arsenal of weapons directed at fighting the 
global war on terrorism.  Additionally, several agencies (primarily schools) were 
discovered that routinely use this technology in safety and surveillance applications that 
do not apply to homeland security.  A total of twenty- six organizations using CCTV 
surveillance technology were contacted and a person knowledgeable in the operation of 
the system was interviewed   A series of questions were asked in order to identify how 
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long the system has been in place, how the choice of camera location was made, whether 
the public was involved in the decision-making process, what training operators must 
complete, whether supervisors monitor camera operations, and whether a policy was 
created and disseminated.  
The debate continues regarding whether CCTV surveillance systems are capable 
of assisting public safety professionals in reducing crime and preventing terrorism.  
Ongoing research may assist homeland security entities in determining if this technology 
serves as a useful tool in protecting society.  This thesis will not participate in that value 
judgment argument.  Regardless of what the future holds for CCTV surveillance systems, 
the sheer volume of cameras presently in use merits oversight attention.  
Business Week conducted a survey shortly after the 9/11/01 attack in order to 
determine whether public support exists for intensive introduction of CCTV surveillance 
systems in public areas.  Overwhelmingly, U.S. citizens supported any effort to create a 
net of surveillance, especially if it involved facial recognition technology in their cities.2  
Combine the eagerness of public safety professionals to install surveillance systems with 
the willingness of the public to allow that to happen, and potential abuse lurks at the turn 
of every camera.  
Measures must be implemented to protect Homeland Security strategists from 
losing a potentially vital technology.  This thesis will present the problems that exist in 
controlling video surveillance systems and the solutions presently in use throughout the 
world.  A thorough evaluation will be launched in order to develop recommended courses 
of action to be taken by public safety executives contemplating the use of video 
surveillance in their jurisdictions.  
 
2 Marcus Nieto, Kimberly Johnston-Dodds, and Charlene Wear Simmons, “Public and Private 
Applications of Video Surveillance and Biometric Technologies,” California Research Bureau (CRB      
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II. INCREASING CCTV SURVEILLANCE 
New York Senator Hillary Clinton urged New York City transit authorities to 
increase the number of CCTV surveillance systems monitoring the subways even though 
there are already more than 5,000 cameras in operation.3  By 2006, Chicago Mayor 
Richard M. Daley hopes to make his video surveillance system one of the largest in the 
world.4  The Pentagon spearheaded a secret plan to develop video surveillance enabling 
the military to track, identify and analyze the movement of every vehicle in a city 
occupied by U.S. troops.5  The Department of Homeland Security earmarked millions of 
dollars for the introduction of surveillance systems in major cities throughout the country.  
In 1998, New York City’s Chinatown had 13 CCTV cameras observing the public 
domain.  In 2004, a mere six years later, the same geographic area now has more than 
600 cameras.6  
Video surveillance has blanketed the American public as a counter-terrorism tool 
and has become the premier weapon in public safety’s arsenal.  Its investigative value 
may be unequaled for the post-incident review.  Its deterrence value may prove to be 
overbearing for the less motivated criminal/terrorist.  As the United States quickly 
approaches the multi-million camera realm that has been established by the United 
Kingdom, precautionary measures must be introduced to prevent, deter, and address 
misuse of video technology by government entities.  America’s foundation lies on a 
strong belief in protecting personal privacy.  Without operating policies, technological 
limitations, national standardization, and legal guidelines, the actions of the nefarious few 
will drastically impact upon those tasked with protecting the American public.  These 
abuses are already occurring and could provide the tipping point for the wave suggesting 
prohibition of video surveillance in the public domain. 
 
3 Associated Press, “Step Up Surveillance, USA,” Wired News, July 24, 2005,   
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0.1848.68296.00.html [Accessed December 10, 2005]. 
4 Stephen Kinzer, “Chicago Moving to ‘Smart’ Surveillance Cameras,” New York Times, sec. A, 
September 21, 2004, late edition.  
5 Tim Reid, “US surveillance will track every car,” Times (London), July 3, 2003,   
http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030703-car-surveillance01.htm [Accessed August 2005].   
6 New York Civil Liberties Union, “Surveillance Camera Project,” 
http://www.nyclu.org/surveillance_camera_main.html [Accessed December 10, 2005]. 
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A. ABUSE AND MISUSE OF THE TECHNOLOGY 
Casinos in Atlantic City (NJ) utilize state-of-the-art video surveillance equipment 
to assist in the detection and prosecution of thieves and cheaters.  A special arm of the 
New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, the Division of Gaming Enforcement, regulates 
the operation of the casinos.  Due to a complaint lodged with the DGE, state officials 
launched an audit.  After reviewing tapes of cameras monitoring the gaming area of the 
Caesars Atlantic City Hotel Casino, they found that more than an hour of images taped by 
two employees was found to be focused inappropriately on women.7  
Several years later, the same casino submitted to a review of its surveillance tapes 
by the Division of Gaming Enforcement.  Even though two employees had been fired in 
the earlier investigation and an $80,000 fine was paid to settle the complaint lodged by 
the victims, similar violations were discovered.  Four more employees had used the 
legally-required hidden cameras to zoom onto specific body parts of females in the 
gaming area.8  
In Tuscaloosa (AL), a surveillance camera trained on an intersection and relaying 
video images to a local cable TV channel changed from stationary viewing to following 
young women walking down the street.  As the camera focused on breasts and buttocks it 
was transmitted live on Comcast Cable’s Channel 45.  Although the camera was installed 
by the city’s department of transportation, several law enforcement agencies possessed 
the authority to override the stationary command of the camera.  The transportation 
director for Tuscaloosa’s Department of Transportation blamed the Alabama State Police 
for inappropriately directing the camera.9  As a result of this incident, the city disabled 
the override function for the State Police.10
 
7 John Curran, “Atlantic City casino fined for hidden cameras’ wandering eyes,” Associated Press New 
York, December 15, 2004, http://www.ap.org [Accessed December 2005]. 
8 Associated Press, “Four surveillance camera operators at N.J. casino accused of ogling female 
patrons,” Associated Press New York, April 27, 2005, http://www.ap.org [Accessed August 2005]. 
9 Jon Gargis, “Strip traffic camera zooms in on bar-goers,” University of Alabama Crimson White, 
September 12, 2003, http://www.cw.ua.edu/vnews/display.v/art/2003/09/12/3f629e6e6a1fd?im_archive=1 
[Accessed June 2005]. 
10 Associated Press, “Three Arrested After Traffic Camera Aimed as (sic) Passersby,” WAFF 48 
News, September 16, 2003, http://www.waff.com/Global/story.asp?S=1445080 [Accessed September 
2005].  
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While on duty at his security surveillance position, an Arizona casino employee 
utilized his agency’s technology to take breast photos of unsuspecting females.  The 
employee received a warning for this transgression.  Even after being warned, the 
employee engaged in the same behavior on another day.  He and his supervisor were 
subsequently terminated from their positions with the tribal casino.11  
A University of Nevada (Reno) professor sued his employer after university 
police allegedly used surveillance cameras to monitor him.  Dr. Hussein S. Hussein had 
obtained millions of dollars in grant funding for animal nutrition research.  After Dr. 
Hussein filed a complaint with the Department of Agriculture regarding the care of 
animals in the trust of the university, Hussein alleged university police notified the FBI 
that he was a homeland security threat.12  Although University Police Chief Adam Garcia 
initially denied having control of the “Homeland Security” video system, he later 
admitted to issuing an order authorizing the surveillance cameras to observe the 
professor’s office door and the hallway leading to it.13  
A 22-year old man shot himself in the head after his relationship with a 16-year 
old girl failed.  The incident was captured by a New York City Police Department 
surveillance camera.  Although the image enabled police to immediately understand the 
circumstances of the death which occurred in the lobby of a housing project, the video 
found its way onto a pornographic web site.  Responsibility for the video leak has been 
directed at the police unit assigned to monitor the surveillance cameras.14
New York City Councilman Hiram Montserrate, a former police officer, related in 
an interview that he had served with the NYPD Video Interactive Patrol Enhancement 
Response (VIPER) Unit.15  Montserrate reported that he witnessed peers using video 
 
11 John Stearns, “2 at casino fired for breast photos, dealers, customers pictured,” Arizona Republic, 
sec. B1, June 5, 2004, http://www.azcentral.com/news/ [Accessed August 2005]. 
12 Scott Sonner, “Nevada researcher alleges university police falsely reported homeland security 
concerns,” Associated Press New York, April 23, 2005, http://www.ap.org [Accessed July 2005]. 
13 Frank X. Mullen, “UNR’s camera network raises fear,” Reno Gazette–Journal, sec. 1A, March 13, 
2005, http://news.rgj.com [Accessed July 2005]. 
14 Ikimulisa Livingston and Philip Messing, “New York Police Seek Leak of Video,” Officer.com 
(April 1, 2004), http://www.officer.com/article/article.jsp?id=11339&siteSection=1 [Accessed June 2005]. 
15 Sarah Wallace, “NYPD Housing Surveillance Staffed by Cops Under Investigation,” Officer.com 
(April 23, 2004), http://www.officer.com/article/article.jsp?id=12078&siteSection=1 [Accessed August 
2005].  
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technology to look into property windows or at women not suspected of any criminal 
activity.  Montserrate stated that there were no administrative controls to prevent access 
to tapes; no training for camera operators; and a lack of supervisory oversight.  When 
Montserrate reported his observations, he was transferred from the VIPER assignment.   
A San Francisco (CA) police officer used the department’s ultra-modern 
surveillance camera system at the International Airport to view the breasts and buttocks 
of women travelers.  The officer spent three hours in the control center engaging in this 
behavior although he was assigned to patrol roads leading into the airport and parking 
areas.  The officer received a 9-month suspension for his inappropriate behavior.16
A Tennessee school district became the target of a federal lawsuit when 
surveillance cameras were discovered in a school locker room.  When confronted with 
the information regarding the placement of the school-sanctioned cameras, administrators 
stated that the images recorded were “…nothing more than images of a few bras and 
panties.”17  
The use of CCTV surveillance systems for personal gain or pleasure fans the 
flames of concern regarding the dangerously invasive potential of the technology.  Every 
incident of abuse serves as a building block for limiting the government’s ability to add 
public domain surveillance to its terrorism prevention methods.  Preventing abuse can 
drastically improve the public’s willingness to empower the government in its efforts to 
protect society.  
 
B. THE FUTURE AND THE TECHNOLOGY 
During the 2001 Super Bowl in Tampa Bay, Florida, 19 petty criminals were 
identified by CCTV surveillance cameras equipped with biometric software18  Since 
regulations do not exist on the use of this technology, a casino could identify persons who 
 
 16 Bay City News, “SF cop who reportedly ogled women is suspended for 9 months,” SFGate.com, 
April 21, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/ baycitynews/ archive/2005/04/21/cop21. 
DTL  [Accessed June 2005].  
17 Amanda Wardle, “Company denies charges,” Nashville City Paper, August 1, 2003, 
www.nashvillecitypaper.com/index.cfm?section_id=9&screen=news&news_id=25248 [Accessed 
December 10, 2005]. 
18 Patrick Marshall, “Privacy Under Attack,” Congressional Quarterly 11, no. 23 (June 15, 2001): 
512. 
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had previously shown a connection between alcohol intake and heavier betting.  By doing 
this, the casino could target the potential high roller for free adult beverages.  Imagine 
shopping in a supermarket and hearing over the public address system commercials and 
sale announcements for products.  Since regulations do not exist on the use of this 
technology, a supermarket could tailor its sale announcements and product commercials 
based on the shoppers identified in the store and their past purchase patterns.  Consider 
technology in the hands of a jealous spouse.  Since regulations do not exist on the use or 
release of images, requests could be made for travel routes, times of visits, and pictures of 
vehicle occupants based purely on a specific vehicle license number. 
 
C. CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION TO VIDEO 
SURVEILLANCE 
According to the routine activity theory of criminology, criminal incidents occur 
when three spheres converge.  The three factors that are necessary to enable prohibited 
behavior are: 1) the motivated offender, 2) a suitable target, and 3) absence of a capable 
guardian.19  In the Homeland Security arena, the offender exists as a result of religious or 
political ideology.  Preventing the motivated offender becomes a huge undertaking that 
involves the tireless efforts of diplomats, mediators and religious leaders.  In crime 
control, minimizing the potential for motivated offenders requires social service 
intervention.  Drug and alcohol rehabilitation, anger management, behavioral 
modification, employment services, etc. become issues that the broad-thinking criminal 
justice professional must engage in order to reduce the number of motivated offenders.  
Unlike the intangible ideologies and the social service concerns, reducing suitable 
targets can be an observed accomplishment.  Hardening potential targets usually requires 
changing the physical structure or improving the visible security measures surrounding 
the structure.  The number of critical infrastructure locations continues to multiply and 
the cost of hardening the targets is astronomical.  Since the process of target-hardening is 
a never-ending process, the likelihood of reasonably reducing the number of suitable 
targets remains slim.  
 
19 Francis Cullen and Robert Agnew, Criminological Theory (Los Angeles: Roxbury, 2003), 269. 
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Capable guardianship endures as the sphere that public safety professionals can 
influence most effectively and efficiently.  This particular realm of the routine activity 
theory purports that communities possessing active oversight tend to be victimized by 
less criminal activity.  Capable guardianship within the neighborhoods of our cities has 
been left to the supervision provided by parents, concerned adults and law enforcement.20  
Technological advances have dramatically changed the capable guardian sphere for 
homeland security threats.  CCTV surveillance of public areas can supplement or 
possibly replace human supervision in the terrorist prevention model.  
Most criminologists assert that the pool of motivated offenders will always exist 
and that attention needs to be directed towards minimizing suitable targets for crime and 
increasing the level of capable guardianship.21  The cost and success of hardening the 
variety of potential terrorist targets can make the mission of neutralizing this sphere 
unreasonable.  This author presents the belief that the most effective and efficient manner 
of exercising the routine activities theory of criminology to homeland security is by using 
CCTV surveillance as capable guardianship. 
 
D. CREATING PANOPTICON CITIES  
An 18th century prison style known as the Panopticon enabled guards to monitor 
prisoners in a manner that prohibited the inmates from knowing when and from where 
they were being watched.22  CCTV surveillance systems operate in much the same 
manner.  The persons tasked with using cameras to observe behavior in the public 
domain can do so without detection.  The end result of the Panopticon prison style and 
urban CCTV surveillance systems is the deterrent value.23  Rather than committing actual 
physical resources to patrol an area of concern, communities can install surveillance 
cameras to foster the perception that someone is always watching.  In order to be an  
effective deterrence tool, publicity and intense communication through informal 
 
20 Curt Bartol and Anne M. Bartol, Delinquency and Justice (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1998), 231. 
21 Cullen and Agnew, Criminological Theory, 269. 
22 Katherine Williams and Craig Johnstone, “The Politics of the Selective Gaze: Closed Circuit 
Television and the Policing of Public Space,” Crime, Law & Social Change (September 2000): 191. 
23 Hille Koskela, “‘Cam Era’- the contemporary urban Panopticon,” Surveillance & Society (2003): 
297, http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles1(3)/camera.pdf [Accessed May 2005]. 
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neighborhood networks must occur.  The subjects of the unobserved surveillance must 
believe that inappropriate behavior will lead to a reaction from law enforcement.  
Panopticon communities are slowly being developed by overlapping camera 
coverage of geographic zones.  In Philadelphia (PA), an endeavor has begun by the police 
department to plot the location of every privately-owned surveillance camera on an 
interactive map.24  Once the project of documenting every camera is completed, a spatial 
analysis will be conducted.  That analysis will note the range of view for each camera and 
will subsequently indicate the zone of coverage available for review by law enforcement.  
By documenting the range and location of every camera privately and publicly operated 
in Philadelphia, future decisions regarding camera installation by city government can 
avoid duplication of coverage.  Additionally, detectives will have a list of potential 
“witnesses” to cull during investigations of criminal and terrorist acts.  
A somewhat different twist on the same idea is occurring in New York (NY).  The 
American Civil Liberties Union has recruited college interns to conduct visual surveys of 
specific geographic areas as part of the “Surveillance Camera Project.”25   As noted on 
the New York Civil Liberties Union website, the project goal lies in the hope of 
stimulating citizen awareness and debate regarding the proliferation of unregulated 
surveillance cameras monitoring the public domain.  
The New York Surveillance Camera Players have conducted their own survey of 
cameras in the public domain.  The group formed to “protest against the use of 
surveillance cameras in public places because the cameras violate our constitutionally 
protected right to privacy.”26  Their website lists 14 different geographic areas in New 
York City and maps the surveillance cameras monitoring those areas.27  This group has 
also conducted similar surveillance camera surveys in other major cities throughout the 
United States.  
 
24 Stacey Irving (Senior Director of Crime Prevention Services—Center City District—Philadelphia, 
PA), interview by author, Philadelphia, PA, August 10, 2005. 
25 New York Civil Liberties Union, “Surveillance Camera Project,” 
http://www.nyclu.org/surveillance_camera_getinvolved.html [Accessed December 10, 2005]. 
26 Surveillance Camera Players, “Who we are & why we’re here,” 
http://www.notbored.org/generic.jpg  [Accessed December 10, 2005].  
27 Surveillance Camera Players, “Maps of Publicly Installed Surveillance Cameras in New York City,” 
http://www.notbored.org/scp-maps.html [Accessed December 10, 2005].  
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Even schools have engaged in the effort to establish a protective video net over 
their properties and their students.  Many districts have a variety of systems in place to 
monitor behavior of students and teachers, but the Reynoldsburg (OH) school district has 
offered local law enforcement live video feed of school hallways and student areas.  This 
policy allows the police to monitor in real time what occurs in the educational facilities of 
that jurisdiction.  
 
E. THE EVOLUTION OF CCTV SURVEILLANCE 
These technology advancements did not occur overnight.  In the United States, the 
origin of CCTV surveillance systems evolved differently from their introduction on the 
European continent.  American cameras originated as passive, unmanned devices 
installed in banks and stores that were open throughout the night.  English cameras were 
an active, constantly monitored technology that viewed public areas.  American cameras 
focused on recording violent offenses, while British equipment concentrated on capturing 
petty thieves and vandals.  
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, government funding enabled CCTV 
surveillance camera pilot programs in Hoboken (NJ) and Mount Vernon (NY).28  Both 
cities suffered from a rash of serious crime.  Surveillance systems were thought to be a 
cutting edge method for assisting the police in their endeavor to reduce crime.  The 
results of the programs failed to support the belief that CCTV surveillance systems could 
perform as useful crime prevention tools.  Nonetheless, a series of cities introduced the 
technology to their cache of weapons to thwart the criminal element.  A variety of issues 
resulted in the failure of these early pilot programs.  As with most government-funded 
initiatives, grants enabled the purchase of the equipment, but the costs of maintaining and 
operating the systems became the responsibility of the agency obtaining the grant.  
Budgetary constraints, lack of success in reducing crime, and insufficient staffing 




28 Marcus Nieto, “Public Video Surveillance: Is It An Effective Crime Prevention Tool?”  California 
Research Bureau (1997): 12, http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/05/crb97-005.pdf [Accessed August 
2005]. 
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CCTV surveillance systems in American cities.  What remained in the United States were 
low grade video systems in banks and businesses that were used as proof for employee 
thefts and investigations of robberies.  
During the mid-1970s, London introduced video surveillance to its public 
transportation hubs and for traffic monitoring.29  In 1986, a town in Great Britain began 
the first significant attempt at monitoring public domains with CCTV surveillance 
systems.  Government officials in King’s Lynn utilized cameras to monitor a very small 
geographic area that suffered from a pattern of minor crimes.30  This project became the 
foundation for using technology to supplement the community’s capable guardianship 
assets.  The overwhelming success of this effort to help reduce crime became the catalyst 
for government-subsidized systems throughout the European country.  As the desire 
increased for CCTV surveillance systems throughout England, more than 75% of the 
United Kingdom’s Home Office spending for crime prevention efforts was spent on 
CCTV initiatives.31  England has evolved as the country with more cameras per capita 
than any other country in the world.  In the period between 1999 and 2001, the British 
government distributed $250 million for CCTV installation; as of 2002, there were more 
than 40,000 CCTV units operating in the United Kingdom.32  It is believed that Britain 
presently uses more than 4.2 million cameras at an expense of $325 million to monitor 
the public domain.33  
A variety of other countries in North America, Europe and Asia utilize CCTV 
surveillance systems in crime control and terrorism prevention efforts.  In the early 
1990s, Canada initiated CCTV surveillance cameras to monitor public areas.34  The 
evolution of Canada’s surveillance camera use mirrored its southern neighbor.  What 
 
29 Michael McCahill and Clive Norris, “CCTV in Britain,” Center for Criminology and Criminal 
Justice, University of Hull-UK, March 2002), http://www.urbaneye.net [Accessed July 2005]. 
30 Nieto, “Public Video Surveillance: Is It An Effective Crime Prevention Tool?” 6.   
31 Brandon C. Welsh and David P. Farrington, “Effects of Closed Circuit Television Surveillance on 
Crime: Protocol for a Systematic Review,” Campbell Collaboration Crime and Justice Group (2003): 3, 
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/doc-pdf/cctv.pdf [Accessed June 2005]. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Associated Press, “A Look at the New Orleans’ CCTV System,”  
http://www.securityinfowatch.com/article/article.jsp?id=3318&siteSection=427 [Accessed April 17, 2005].  
34 Nieto, “Public Video Surveillance: Is It An Effective Crime Prevention Tool?” 9. 
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began as an effort to reduce robberies in banks and stores morphed into the monitoring of 
mass transit mediums, public areas and eventually border checkpoints.  Like America, 
Canada initially used CCTV surveillance systems in crime suppression but later focused 
on terrorism issues.  France’s focus for CCTV surveillance systems has been to combat 
terrorist activity.  The French embarked on strategic placement of cameras to actively 
monitor municipal buses, trains and train stations, and airport terminals.35  In Northern 
Ireland, the British military uses video surveillance to monitor the Catholic areas of 
Belfast.36  In addition to the military operations, the Irish have utilized private CCTV 
systems since the 1980s to observe shopping areas, post offices and banks.37  Like the 
French, Northern Ireland has installed cameras along their public and commercial rail 
lines.  According to research conducted by Marcus Nieto, Spain uses video surveillance 
to monitor public areas in order to combat terrorism and street crime.  Russia and Italy 
utilize the technology to view government properties and tourist areas.  Nieto also reports 
that China and  Iran use CCTV covertly to observe their citizens.  
CCTV operations are spreading across the world in the private and public sectors.  
Systems are used to prevent crime, assist in investigating criminal offenses, reduce the 
need for human resources and increase homeland security protection grids.  Legal and 
professional standards should be implemented to solidify the public’s faith in the ability 
of government to protect civil liberties as technology evolves.  
 
 
35 Nieto, “Public Video Surveillance: Is It An Effective Crime Prevention Tool?” 9. 
36 Nils Zurawski, “I Know Where Your Live!-Aspects of Watching, Surveillance and Social Control 
in a Conflict Zone,” Surveillance & Society (2005): 508, http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/ articles 
2(4)ni.pdf [Accessed September 2005]. 
37 Nieto, “Public Video Surveillance: Is It An Effective Crime Prevention Tool?” 9. 
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III. EARLY SOCIETY’S LEGAL STANDARDS 
In ancient societies, customs and traditions provided behavior guidelines for tribes 
and communities.  Although unwritten, the rules guided loosely knit groups of people to 
act in a manner that protected the property and well-being of group members.  Written 
edicts of conduct followed with the Code of Hammurabi, the Mosaic Code, and the 
Twelve Tables.38  The Code of Hammurabi was chiseled on rock columns in 2100 B.C.39  
In 1200 B.C., the Mosaic Code became the foundation for American law.40  In 450 B.C., 
the Roman Empire published the Twelve Tables which every Roman citizen was required 
to memorize.41  
The codes and tables possessed authority in the community because of social 
contracts.  Philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John H. Laub defined social contracts as the 
willingness of a population to voluntarily sacrifice a small amount of individual rights in 
order to enable the government to maintain control.42  This sociological process 
developed during people’s migration to cities and served as the focal point for civilized 
living.  
The success of the social contract hinges on the faith that citizens have in their 
government.  In the realm of video surveillance for the public domain, acceptance of 
government-operated programs remains crucial in maintaining the social contract.  If 
support does not exist, then the social contract between citizens and their government 
becomes strained.  As distrust increases, then pressure surfaces to introduce controls to 
limit the capabilities of government.  Programs such as video surveillance may become 





38 Allison Payne, “Introduction to Criminology” (lecture, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 
PA, September 13, 2004). 
39 Stephen Light, Understanding Criminal Justice (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1999), 74. 
40 Ibid, 75. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid, 96. 
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A. PUBLIC SUPPORT 
Studies have been conducted around the world to determine if public support 
exists for government surveillance systems.  Research conducted in Australia by Ditton 
and Short (1998) and Ditton (2000) revealed that not only did such support exist, but it 
was overwhelming.43  During the early stages of CCTV, English surveys showed that a 
very small percentage of people were concerned about government surveillance systems 
being used for the infringement of civil liberties.  In the mid 90s, a Glasgow poll showed 
a 95% acceptance rate for public surveillance systems.44  More recent English surveys 
have consistently shown an acceptance rate of more than 65% for those asked if they 
support CCTV surveillance systems.45  An article written in the Norwegian newspaper 
Aftenposten related that 66% of Norwegians surveyed about CCTV surveillance systems 
support their use.46  
Although the citizens of the world clearly support the implementation of CCTV 
surveillance, a growing number of people express concern about the potential for abuse.  
As CCTV becomes more widely used, trepidation increases regarding the lack of control 
or oversight for the technology.  A German survey conducted during the summer of 2003 
by the Berlin Institute for Social Research found that 65% of the people interviewed felt 
that CCTV systems presented a potential for abuse.47  The same survey found that people 
strongly desire the implementation of strict regulations for the release and storage length 
of video images, as well as inspection, registration and licensing of systems.  
 
B. CCTV LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Although Great Britain led the world in the use of CCTV surveillance systems, 
the country reacted slowly to introduce legislation that could control the public domain 
 
43 Dean Wilson and Dr. Adam Sutton, “Open-Street CCTV in Australia: A Comparative Study of 
Establishment and Operation,” A Report to the Criminology Research Council (November 2003): 5. 
44 Phillip Edwards and Nick Tilley, “Closed Circuit Television Looking Out For You,” Home Office 
Police Research Group (1995), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk [Accessed April 2005]. 
45 McCahill and Norris, “CCTV in Britain,” 20. 
46 Ann Rudinow Saetnan, Johanne Yttri Dahl, and Heidi Mork Lomell, “Views from under 
surveillance.  Public opinion in a closely watched area in Oslo,” Urbaneye Project (January 2004), 
http://www.urbaneye.net [Accessed May 2005]. 
47 Frank Helten and Bernd Fischer, “What Do People Think About CCTV? Findings From a Berlin 
Survey,” Berlin Institute for Social Research (February 2004): 18. 
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observations.  The Human Rights Act 1998, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000, and the Data Protection Act 1998 had elements that specifically regulated CCTV 
operations.48  
• The Human Rights Act 1998 included two sections that applied to the use 
of CCTV surveillance systems.  The first section, Article 6, addressed the 
right to a fair trial.  The second, Article 8, protected the right to respect for 
family and private life.  The Act established British law that allowed 
surveillance video of the public domain to be used in criminal cases.49   
• Specifically drafted to control government CCTV operations, the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 provided legal 
guidelines for police agencies.  The act required that CCTV surveillance 
be proportionate, legal, accountable, and necessary.  This legislation 
required supervisory oversight and meticulous record keeping.50  
• The Data Protection Act 1998 required that the installation and operation 
of CCTV systems to monitor public domains had to be done in 
conformance with a specific legal basis.  The act also required any 
government or private entity to register surveillance systems with the Data 
Commissioner.51  This legislation prohibits the release of images except 
for purposes of crime prevention and detection.52  The act required every 
CCTV surveillance system to be registered with the Information 
Commissioner and to be operated using the principles of openness, 
fairness and proportionality.53         
In July 2000, the British Data Commissioner issued a document entitled, “CCTV 
Codes of Practice.”  This government missive provided data protection rules for the 
gathering, storage and protection of CCTV images.  In order to ensure that every CCTV 
camera system operated in compliance with the Code, every system had to be registered 
with the government by 2003.54  This major set of guidelines requires all persons 
utilizing surveillance camera systems to:  
• install cameras at locations based on specific crime or public safety needs 
 
48 McCahill and Norris, “CCTV in Britain,” 4. 
49 Ibid, 52. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid, 53. 
52 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, “CCTV,” Postnote, no. 175 (April 2002): 4, 
http://www.parliament.uk/post/pn175.pdf [Accessed June 2005].  
53 Marianne L. Gras, “The Legal Regulation of CCTV in Europe,” Surveillance & Society (2004): 217, 
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles2(2)/regulation.pdf [Accessed May 2005]. 
54 Ibid. 
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• use the system for the stated purpose and not for other labor or employee 
performance reasons 
• be able to view only the areas related to the problem and not surrounding 
private property 
• maintain records showing access and chain of custody for all images 
• adhere to retention restrictions for images 
• allow image subjects to obtain copies of any and all images 
• implement safeguards to prevent improper access to images55  
Based on a claim of invasion to privacy allegedly committed by police authorities 
in Great Britain, the European Commission of Human Rights ruled that images taken of a 
person in a public area do not constitute a privacy violation as long as the images are not 
made available to the general public.56  
Similar to the American system of justice, English law often develops when 
magistrates interpret legislation as it applies to actual incidents.  Deliberation in criminal 
courts provides judges with the opportunity to decide how a law was intended to regulate 
society.  Technological advances periodically stretch the boundaries of the written law.  
When the English rules of evidence were established regarding images, photographs were 
among the items considered by the lawmakers.  CCTV surveillance system pictures 
unveiled a new ability to capture the actions of persons over a wide range of area.  In 
1982, English courts (R v. Grimer and R v. Fowden and White) decided that this new 
technology should possess the same validity as that of an eyewitness observation.57
 
C. CCTV STANDARDS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In addition to legal standards established to control CCTV systems in England, 
informal guidelines were published for private companies considering the 
implementation of this technology.  The guidelines have no legal standing but are 
published by the Home Office as a resource for private and public organizations 
considering the introduction of CCTV.  
 
55 McCahill and Norris, “CCTV in Britain,” 54. 
56 Ralph Beddard, “Photographs and the Rights of the Individual,” Modern Law Review 58, no. 6 
(November 1995): 780. 
57 James Sheptycki, “Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television and Social Control,” Policing and 
Society 9 (2000): 430. 
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The Home Office guidelines offer private entities the opportunity to utilize the 
police as consultants and advisors in the implementation of CCTV schemes.  In its efforts 
to successfully introduce CCTV surveillance systems to the public domain, the political 
leadership of the United Kingdom encourages the use of the Police Service.  The 
guidelines state that law enforcement professionals are available to evaluate the need for 
CCTV; establish a code of practice; train operators; develop command and control 
formats; encourage community support; and conduct spot checks during operational 
periods.58  
 
D. CCTV LAW IN THE UNITED STATES  
When it comes to U.S. Federal law, there is little that specifically applies to 
regulating CCTV surveillance systems.  The primary issue attached to the CCTV debate 
lies in the belief that Americans have a right to privacy.  The Constitution of the United 
States does not guarantee a right to privacy.  The Fourth Amendment provides protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, but it does not limit actions that private 
citizens can engage in that directly affect another person’s privacy.  The legal restrictions 
apply only to actions precipitated by the government and arguably limit infringement 
upon privacy, but they do not provide a right to that privacy.  The courts have ruled that 
government entities may observe public areas because no expectation of privacy exists.  
Technology may be used to conduct video surveillance but not to intercept 
communication between people.  The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
requires a search warrant in order to monitor conversations in the public arena.59
The key piece of legislation empowering government agencies to conduct CCTV 
surveillance over public domains lies in the 1967 Supreme Court case, Katz v. United 
States.60  In that case, the Court ruled that a reasonable expectation of privacy test should 
be applied in order to determine if a government search was illegal.  The test required 
answering two questions:  did the subject of the search have an expectation of privacy 
and would society agree upon the subject’s belief that the expectation was reasonable.  
 
58 Edwards and Tilley, “Closed Circuit Television Looking Out For You.” 
59 Patrick Marshall, “Privacy Under Attack,” 513. 
60 Nieto, Johnston-Dodds, and Simmons, “Public and Private Applications of Video Surveillance and 
Biometric Technologies,” 38.   
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Only if both questions were answered in the affirmative would there be reason to acquire 
a search warrant before seizing evidence.  Second millennium societal beliefs do not hold 
that public spaces provide an individual with an expectation of privacy.  Due to this 
existing mindset, the use of video technology to monitor public areas would not be in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
In 2001, the Supreme Court pondered the government’s use of technology to gain 
information regarding criminal wrongdoing allegedly occurring inside private property.  
In Kyllo v. United States, the police used a device capable of conducting thermal imaging 
detection in order to ascertain if a homeowner was using powerful lights to facilitate the 
growth of marijuana.61  The court ruled that a warrant was necessary if the government 
utilized a device “not in general public use” to make observations of a private property 
that could not have been made without entering the property.62  An argument could be 
presented that the results of this case limit the use of CCTV surveillance systems.  The 
flaw in such a claim is that as time progresses, CCTV surveillance systems have become 
a commonly used technology thus negating the “not in general public use” clause of the 
Supreme Court’s decision.  
A variety of unintentional personal data releases prompted Congress and several 
state legislatures to enact protective edicts forcing credit card companies and retail 
establishments to shield consumer information.  The laws have not bridged the gap that 
divides personal information with video images that reflect a person’s appearance.  
Although significant concern exists to protect the privacy issues related to a person’s 
purchase patterns and medical records, little concern has surfaced regarding CCTV 
surveillance systems. 
The research for this thesis included contacting the police departments of the 
nation’s 50 largest cities.  The municipalities that utilize CCTV surveillance systems to 
monitor the public domain have no legal guidelines regulating the system’s control, 
operation, training, or release of images.  This research found neither legal challenges nor 
indications of judicial support for privacy arguments applying to public spaces.  
 
61 Nieto, Johnston-Dodds, and Simmons, “Public and Private Applications of Video Surveillance and 
Biometric Technologies,” 39.   
62 Kyllo v. U.S., 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001). 
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Nevertheless, as the number of covert camera schemes increase, laws to limit their 
use must be developed.  One such example of this phenomena occurred in Long Island, 
New York.  Stephanie Fuller was victimized by a voyeuristic landlord who installed a 
video camera in her bedroom.63  Since there were no laws prohibiting invasion of privacy 
behavior, the victim initiated a change in legislation.  The change made covert video 
surveillance conducted for amusement, entertainment or voyeuristic purposes a class D 
felony punishable by 2 to 7 years in prison.64
 
E. CCTV STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States has a variety of professional organizations that provide 
operational and administrative guidance for its members.  Four major law enforcement 
organizations developed an accrediting agency to assist departments in creating and 
maintaining professional standards.  The Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) provides a rigorous certification process for the  
nation’s police departments.  As of December 2005, the only CALEA standards 
regulating CCTV in organizations that submit to the certification process include the 
following: 
• 72.8.2 If audio and/or visual surveillance equipment is used, a written 
directive specifies that the equipment will be controlled to reduce the 
possibility of invading a detainee's privacy.  
• 41.3.8 If agency-owned, in-car audio or video recording systems are used, 
a written directive establishes policy and procedures for the following:   
• a) situations for use  
• b) tape security and access    
• c) tape storage and retention 
• 43.1.4 A written directive establishes a system for the authorization, 
distribution, and use of surveillance and undercover equipment.  
• 83.2.2 A written directive governs procedures used for photography and 
video taping pursuant to the collection and preservation of evidence and 
specifies the information to be recorded at the time this tape is taken.65 
 
63 “Stephanie’s Law Creates Criminal Penalties for Covert Use of Viewing Devices on Unsuspecting 
Victims,” New York State Governor’s Press Releases, June 23, 2003, 
http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/03/june23_1_03.htm  [Accessed June 2005].    
64 Ibid. 
65 “2005 CALEA Standards Manual,” Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies. 
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Since legal guidelines do not yet restrict the use of CCTV surveillance systems, 
the Justice Department issued policy guidelines for video surveillance by government 
agencies.  The standard presents the opinion that the existing Federal Wiretap Act (Title 
III) does not control the use of CCTV systems.  It also notes that requests for search 
warrants permitting the use of video surveillance have been held to a higher standard in 
six of the circuit courts.66  
Foreseeing the increased use of technology in the investigation and prosecution of 
criminal cases, the American Bar Association developed a set of standards entitled 
“Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance.”  Standard 2-9.1 states that the need for 
regulation arises because technology can “diminish privacy, freedom of speech, 
association and travel, and the openness of society.”67  The committee responsible for the 
drafting of the document did not recommend prohibiting CCTV video surveillance of 
public domains.  Instead, the guidance directed law enforcement officials to coordinate 
with the citizens of the area where the proposed video coverage would extend.  The 
collaboration would include advising the citizens of the intended location of the camera 
and its capabilities.  Additionally, public meetings should be held so that the value of the 
continued surveillance could be evaluated or improved upon.  The standard strongly 
recommended the development of administrative controls and protocols for the storage 
and release of images.    
 
F. CCTV LAW IN OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
Member countries of the European Union are required to blend legal standards 
established by the EU into their own country’s legislative restrictions.  The European 
Data Protection Directive 95/46 uses language that could be applied to the CCTV 
issues.68  In July 1982, Danish lawmakers restricted private video surveillance of 
 
66 Nieto, Johnston-Dodds, and Simmons, “Public and Private Applications of Video Surveillance and 
Biometric Technologies,” 50.  
67 American Bar Association Standard 2-9.1(b). “Electronic Surveillance: Technologically-Assisted 
Physical Surveillance,” Adopted 1998.    
68 Carsten Wiecek and Ann Rudinow Saetnan, “Restrictive? Permissive? The Contradictory Framing 
of Video Surveillance in Norway and Denmark,” Urbaneye Project (March 2002), 
http://www.urbaneye.net [Accessed July 2005]. 
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publicareas.69  Although this legislation does not address government use of CCTV 
technologies, section 264 of the Penal Code provides two guidelines for public officials: 
• the surveillance is necessary as part of a continuing investigation 
• the offense is punishable by 18 months or more of imprisonment.70 
Norway does not participate in the European Union but has used that compact’s 
directives in the formation of law.  The EU Data Protection Directive appears to be the 
genesis for Norway’s Personal Data Act which was released in January 2001.71  
Although the Act does not specifically mention CCTV surveillance systems, it has been  
interpreted to apply to this technology.  As such, the registration requirement for 
operation of CCTV systems must be completed by persons wishing to utilize this type of 
surveillance.  
German law strictly regulates the use of video surveillance for the public 
domain.72  A 1983 decision determined that in order to have a democratic society, 
persons must know why they are the subject of surveillance and by whom they are being 
watched.73  German police are permitted to conduct surveillances related to criminal 
activity or of areas that are high threat but are not allowed to permanently affix 
surveillance cameras to observe public areas.  The topic of CCTV surveillance generated 
a decade of volatile political debate in Germany which was resolved in January 2003 with 
the Police and Public Order Act.  The act permitted the police to monitor areas of high 
threat and to permanently store images from those identified locations.74  An interesting 
twist in German law limits private CCTV surveillance system use.  A store owner can 
utilize covert surveillance cameras to enable employees to prevent a crime from 
 
69 Carsten Wiecek and Ann Rudinow Saetnan, “Restrictive? Permissive? The Contradictory Framing 
of Video Surveillance in Norway and Denmark,” Urbaneye Project (March 2002), 
http://www.urbaneye.net [Accessed July 2005] 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Helten and Fischer, “What do people think about CCTV? Findings from a Berlin survey,” 4.   
73 Eric Topfer, Leon Hampel and Heather Cameron, “Watching the Bear,” Urbaneye Project 
(December 2003), http://www.urbaneye.net [Accessed July 2005]. 
74 Topfer, Hampel and Cameron, “Watching the Bear.” 
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occurring.  Systems that merely record evidence of a crime that was permitted to occur 
are deemed to be a form of entrapment and therefore illegal.75  
The Austrian Constitution does not provide an individual right to privacy.76  
Austria has an extensive traffic safety surveillance system that monitors roadways and 
tunnels.  Several laws exist that regulate the use of audio and video surveillance 
equipment but none of it restricts the authority of the police to conduct monitoring of 
public areas.  
Swiss law does not have any provisions that regulate the operation, management 
or control of government owned CCTV surveillance systems.77  Legal cause must exist in 
order for Swiss authorities to utilize CCTV technology.  In order for video surveillance to 
be authorized along the country’s border, legislation had to be crafted to permit such 
activity.  An exception to the need for legislative action for video surveillance would be 
“in the case of danger or of an overt risk.”78  
In France, CCTV surveillance systems must be approved by a panel consisting of 
judges and elected officials from the geographic area.  The application process must be 
completed for every private institution wishing to introduce CCTV surveillance to either 
the work environment or the public domain.  Police agencies are exempt from the legal 
requirement of surveillance system registration.  
Canada addressed the admissibility of CCTV surveillance camera images 
following the hockey riots of 1994 in Toronto.  According to Anatomy of Crime, 
government cameras recorded several hundred unknown citizens engaging in criminal 
activity.79  The images were posted on web sites and publicized through the media.  The 
Canadian courts ruled that CCTV images should be valued more than a human 
eyewitness.  In the months following the destruction in Toronto, 161 people were 
 
75 Gras, “The Regulation of CCTV in Europe,” 220. 
76 Steven Ney and Kurt Pichler, “Video Surveillance in Austria,” Urbaneye Project (April 2002), 
http://www.urbaneye.net  [Accessed July 2005]. 
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arrested.  Because of the video evidence, all but one pled guilty.  The remaining 
individual was subsequently convicted for his involvement in the riots.  
A variety of laws and standards exist throughout the world to regulate CCTV 
surveillance systems.  It is evident that the longer a society submits to video technology 
monitoring the public domain, the more controls and regulations are enacted.  Oliver 
Wendell Holmes said, “The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through 
many centuries.”80  U.S. Homeland Security professionals should heed the lessons 
learned by its European allies.  Laws and standards should be created by public safety 
administrators to minimize the possibility of CCTV surveillance system abuse. 
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IV. SURVEYS OF ORGANIZATIONS USING CCTV 
This author sought guidelines and policies already in place regulating CCTV 
surveillance systems in the United States.  The most common public and quasi-public 
organizations using video surveillance are police departments and school districts.  In the 
private realm, the business best known for its use of actively monitored CCTV 
surveillance is the casino industry.  
During the literature review for this thesis, thirty-seven (37) police departments, 
school districts and casinos were identified as having CCTV surveillance systems in their 
arsenal of tools to thwart crime and terrorism.  In addition to the agencies identified 
during the thesis research, the author contacted the police departments for the fifty (50) 
most populated municipalities in the United States to ascertain which organizations 
utilize public domain surveillance systems.  As of February 15, 2006, the responses from 
the police departments of the fifty (50) most populated municipalities are as follows: 
• Seventeen (17) are utilizing surveillance systems in the public domain 
• Nineteen (19) are not utilizing surveillance systems in the public domain 
• Fourteen (14) have not responded to requests for information 
A total of twenty-three (23) organizations expressed a willingness to participate in 
the survey process used for this thesis.  Three departments have surveillance systems but 
did not participate in the survey.  New Orleans (LA) declined due to their ongoing 
priority of recovering from Hurricane Katrina.  Sacramento (CA) and Long Beach (CA) 
are both in the development stage of introducing surveillance systems to their 
jurisdictions.  
The contact person for each of the noted agencies agreed to submit to a survey.  
The questionnaire was crafted to understand the size of the target agency, the length of 
time that CCTV operations have been in operation, and to identify methods to prevent 
abuse of the technology.  During the interview process, the contact persons answered the 
following questions: 
• How long the organization has used CCTV surveillance cameras 
• How many cameras made up the organization’s surveillance system 
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• How the agency decided where to install surveillance cameras 
• Whether the cameras are actively or passively monitored 
• Whether the cameras are operating 24 hours/7 days a week 
• Whether the organization has a policy for CCTV operations 
• Whether the community had input in the implementation process 
• What the training entailed for CCTV operators 
• Whether there is constant supervision of CCTV operations 
• How the decision is made regarding the release of images 
• How long images are saved 
• Whether the system would be used to prevent a crime or serve as evidence 
after the crime 
• Whether any state or local laws exists regulating CCTV operations 
• Whether private CCTV operations must register with a government agency 
• How the agency prevents abuse of the CCTV operation  
• Whether the agency has received any complaints regarding its CCTV 
operation 
• Whether images have been successfully used for criminal prosecutions 
 
A. ALEXANDRIA (VA) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for eighteen years 
and the operation includes more than sixty cameras.  The cameras were installed at 
locations determined by a security consultant.  The system is actively monitored and 
operates on a 24/7 basis.  A written policy for operations does exist however it was 
unavailable for review.  The community was not involved in the initial or subsequent 
implementation process.  The only training available to the CCTV operators is on-the-job 
training.  Constant supervision does not exist for CCTV operations.  Any requests for 
images are forwarded to the Division Chief for review.  The images are saved until 
storage space is no longer available.  At this time, it is believed that storage space will 
never be an issue.  The operators have not been trained on what to do if an operator 
observes a suspicious person checking car doors.  The contact person in Alexandria did 
not know if any state or local laws apply to CCTV operations.  Private agencies wishing 
to utilize CCTV systems must obtain certification through the Commonwealth of 
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Virginia.  Enforcement of the written policy prevents abuse.  The department has not 
received any complaints from the public regarding the use of its cameras.  Recorded 
images have not yet been used in any prosecutions for criminal behavior. 
 
B. ANCHORAGE (AK) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for more than ten 
years and the operation includes six cameras.  The cameras were installed at locations 
determined by the department.  The system is passively monitored and operates on a 24/7 
basis.  A written policy for operations does not exist.  The community was not involved 
in the initial or subsequent implementation process.  The only training available to the 
CCTV operators is on-the-job training.  Constant supervision does not exist for CCTV 
operations.  Any requests for images are forwarded to the Chief for review.  The images 
are saved until storage space is no longer available.  At this time, it is believed that 
storage space will never be an issue.  If an operator observes a suspicious person 
checking car doors, the operator dispatches police to prevent the crime rather than 
waiting for the offense to occur.  No state or local laws apply to CCTV operations.  
Private agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are not required to register with any 
government agency in the jurisdiction.  Controlled access to the system prevents abuse.  
The department has not received any complaints from the public regarding the use of its 
cameras.  Recorded images have not yet been used in any prosecutions for criminal 
behavior. 
 
C. ATLANTA (GA) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for one year and 
the operation includes more than thirty cameras.  The cameras were installed at locations 
chosen by the department and by the funding sources.  The system is passively monitored 
and operates on a 24/7 basis.  A written policy for operations does not exist.  The 
community was not involved in the initial or subsequent implementation process.  The 
only training available to the CCTV operators is on-the-job training.  Constant 
supervision does not exist for CCTV operations.  Any requests for images are forwarded 
to the Public Affairs Division for review.  The images are saved for 90 days.  If an 
operator observes a suspicious person checking car doors, the operator waits until the 
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crime is committed before taking action.  No state or local laws apply to CCTV 
operations.  Private agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are not required to register 
with any government agency in the jurisdiction.  Controlling access to the video center 
and constant video monitoring of the operators prevents abuse.  The department has not 
received any complaints from the public regarding the use of its cameras.  Recorded 
images have been used to successfully prosecute more than twelve criminal cases. 
 
D. BALTIMORE (MD) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for four years and 
the operation includes more than two hundred cameras.  The cameras were installed at 
locations chosen by the department.  The system is actively monitored and operates on a 
24/7 basis.  A written policy for operations does not exist.  The community was involved 
in the initial and subsequent implementation process.  The only training available to the 
CCTV operators is on-the-job training.  Constant supervision exists for West Side 
cameras but not for other areas of the city.  Any requests for images are forwarded to the 
State Attorney’s Office.  The images are saved for 28 days.  If an operator observes a 
suspicious person checking car doors, the operator dispatches police to prevent the crime 
rather than waiting for the offense to occur.   No state or local laws apply to CCTV 
operations.  Private agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are not required to register 
with any government agency in the jurisdiction.  Security companies are required to be 
licensed through the state.  Close supervision prevents abuse.  The department has not 
received any complaints from the public regarding the use of its cameras.  Recorded 
images have been used to successfully prosecute several criminal cases. 
 
E. CENTENNIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT (PORTLAND, OR) 
The school district has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for more than 
ten years and the operation includes more than eighty cameras.  The cameras were 
installed at locations based on input from school staff.  The system is passively monitored 
and operates on a 24/7 basis.  A written policy for operations does not exist.  The 
community was not involved in the initial or subsequent implementation process.  CCTV 
operators receive special training.  Constant supervision does not exist for CCTV 
operations.  Any request for images will be granted upon written request.  The images are 
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saved for 14 days.   If an operator observes a suspicious person checking car doors, the 
operator dispatches police to prevent the crime rather than waiting for the offense to 
occur.  The contact person did not know if state or local laws apply to CCTV operations.  
Private agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are not required to register with any 
government agency in the jurisdiction.  No measures have been taken to prevent abuse. 
The school district has not received any complaints from the public regarding the use of 
its cameras.  Recorded images have been used to successfully prosecute criminal 
behavior.   
 
F. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBERG (NC) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for fifteen years 
and the operation includes more than one hundred cameras.  The cameras were installed 
at locations chosen by the department in coordination with downtown building owners.  
The system is actively monitored and operates on a 24/7 basis.  A written policy for 
operations does not exist.  The community was not involved in the initial or subsequent 
implementation process.  CCTV operators receive special training.  Constant supervision 
does exist for CCTV operations.  Requests for images must be made in writing and are 
evaluated by the Chief.  The images are saved for 3-5 days.  If an operator observes a 
suspicious person checking car doors, the operator dispatches police to prevent the crime 
rather than waiting for the offense to occur.  No state or local laws apply to CCTV 
operations.  Private agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are not required to register 
with any government agency in the jurisdiction.  The small number of persons authorized 
to access the system prevents abuse.  The department has not received any complaints 
from the public regarding the use of its cameras.  Recorded images have been used in 
prosecutions for criminal behavior. 
 
G. CHICAGO (IL) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for two and a half 
years and the operation includes more than one hundred cameras.  The cameras were 
installed at locations chosen by the department.  The system is actively monitored and 
operates on a 24/7 basis.  A written policy entitled Operation Disruption Video 
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Surveillance Pilot Program and dated August 5, 2003 does exist for CCTV operations and 
includes the following elements: 
• A Deputy Chief is designated as being the pilot program director 
• Field supervisors and personnel assigned to monitor video surveillance 
must receive special training 
• Limits operation of cameras to trained personnel only 
• Cameras are to be put on automatic mode when not being directly 
monitored 
• Training consists of 1st Amendment, 4th Amendment, consent search 
issues and proper operation of the surveillance equipment 
• Requests for retrieval of images will be initiated by a supervisor and 
submitted on a Retrieval Request Form 
• Copied images will be entered into the Evidence and Recovered Property 
Section 
The community was not involved in the initial or subsequent implementation 
process.  Special training advises employees of the technical capabilities of the software 
and hardware.  Refresher courses are held reminding personnel of the 1st Amendment and 
4th Amendment issues.  Constant supervision does not exist for CCTV operations.  Any 
requests for images are submitted by a supervisor through the chain of command by 
completing a Retrieval Request Form.  The images are saved for 72 hours.  If an operator 
observes a suspicious person checking car doors, the operator dispatches police to 
prevent the crime rather than waiting for the offense to occur.  No state or local laws 
apply to CCTV operations.  The contact person in Chicago did not know if private 
agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are required to register with any government 
agency in the jurisdiction.  Training, close supervision, and controlling access to the 
video center prevents abuse.  The department has not received any complaints from the 
public regarding the use of its cameras.  Recorded images have been used to successfully 
prosecute several criminal cases.    
 
H. DALLAS (TX) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for two and a half 
years and the operation includes more than eighty-five cameras.  The cameras were 
installed at locations chosen by the department.  The system is passively monitored and 
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operates on a 24/7 basis.  A written policy for operations does not exist.  The community 
was not involved in the initial or subsequent implementation process.  The vendor 
provides training to the CCTV operators and on-the-job training occurs with a technician.  
Constant supervision does exist for CCTV operations.  Any requests for images are 
forwarded to the Chief who abides with the provisions of the Sunshine Law.  The images 
are saved for 60-90 days.  If an operator observes a suspicious person checking car doors, 
the operator dispatches police to prevent the crime rather than waiting for the offense to 
occur.  No state or local laws apply to CCTV operations.  Private agencies wishing to 
utilize CCTV systems are not required to register with any government agency in the 
jurisdiction.  Controlling access to the video center prevents abuse.  The department has 
not received any complaints from the public regarding the use of its cameras.  Recorded 
images have not yet been used in any prosecutions for criminal behavior. 
 
I. FRESNO (CA) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for less than one 
year and the operation includes more than thirty cameras.  The cameras were installed at 
locations based on crime data.  The system is actively monitored and operates on a 24/7 
basis.  A written policy for operations does not exist.  The community was involved in 
the initial and subsequent implementation process.  CCTV operators do not receive any 
special training.  Constant supervision does exist for CCTV operations.  A system does 
not exist for handling requests for images, or for determining how long images should be 
saved.  If an operator observes a suspicious person checking car doors, the operator 
dispatches police to prevent the crime rather than waiting for the offense to occur.  The 
contact person did not know if state or local laws apply to CCTV operations.  Private 
agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are not required to register with any 
government agency in the jurisdiction.  Controlling access to the video center prevents 
abuse.  The department has not received any complaints from the public regarding the use 







J. HONOLULU (HI) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for more than ten 
years and the operation includes twenty six cameras.  The cameras were installed at 
locations based on crime data.  The system is passively monitored and operates on a 24/7 
basis.  A written policy entitled Video Monitoring System and dated July 9, 2003 does 
exist for CCTV operations and includes the following elements: 
• The District Commander supervises all CCTV operations 
• The system will be used to address the fear of crime and enhance the 
quality of life 
• The system may be used to address street crime and monitor suspicious 
activity that may lead to the commission of a crime 
• The system may be used to monitor public events that attract large crowds 
of people 
• Civilian volunteers and police officers may work in the video control 
center after receiving training and written instructions 
• Personnel monitoring cameras will not view the screens for more than two 
consecutive hours 
• Chain of custody procedures are outlined 
• Employees observing criminal activity are required to prepare a statement 
using a specific department form 
The community was not involved in the initial and subsequent implementation 
process.  Special training advises employees of the technical capabilities of the software 
and hardware.  Refresher courses are held reminding personnel of the 1st Amendment and 
4th Amendment issues.  Constant supervision does exist for CCTV operations.  Any 
requests for images are forwarded to the Legal Department.  The images are saved for 7 
days.  If an operator observes a suspicious person checking car doors, the operator would 
wait until the offense occurs before dispatching police.  State and local laws do not apply 
to CCTV operations.  Private agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are not required 
to register with any government agency in the jurisdiction.  Close supervision prevents 
abuse.  The department has not received any complaints from the public regarding the use 





K. LITTLE ROCK (AR) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for one year and 
the operation includes four cameras.  The cameras were installed at locations based on 
crime data and neighborhood requests.  The system is passively monitored and operates 
on a 24/7 basis.  A written policy for operations does not exist.  The community was 
involved in the initial and subsequent implementation process.  CCTV operators do not 
receive any special training.  Constant supervision does not exist for CCTV operations.  
Any requests for images will be granted upon written request.  The images are saved for 
7 days.  If an operator observes a suspicious person checking car doors, the operator 
dispatches police to prevent the crime rather than waiting for the offense to occur.  State 
and local laws do not apply to CCTV operations.  Private agencies wishing to utilize 
CCTV systems are not required to register with any government agency in the 
jurisdiction.  Controlling access to the video center prevents abuse.  The department has 
not received any complaints from the public regarding the use of its cameras.  Recorded 
images have not yet been used in any prosecutions for criminal behavior. 
 
L. LOS ANGELES (CA) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for three years and 
the operation includes more than fifty cameras.  The cameras were installed at locations 
based on crime data.  The system is passively and actively monitored and operates on a 
24/7 basis.  A written policy entitled Hollywood Area Administrative Order No. 2 and 
dated October 1, 2004 does exist for CCTV operations and includes the following 
elements: 
• Cameras will only be used to observe public spaces 
• A control log will document activation and deactivation of the cameras 
• Images will only be viewed in secure area 
• Termination is threatened for misuse of the system 
• The targeting and tracking of individuals based on race, gender, ethnicity, 
sexual orientation, disability or other classifications protected by law is 
prohibited 
• Areas where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy may not be 
observed 
• Quarterly audits are conducted to ensure compliance with the policy 
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• The public is notified of camera capabilities and posts warning signs in 
target areas 
• Regular reports are prepared for CCTV camera use 
• Public input will be sought for CCTV implementation  
The community was involved in both the initial and subsequent implementation 
process.  CCTV operators receive 30 minutes of special training.  Constant supervision 
does exist for CCTV operations.  Any requests for images are forwarded to the Legal 
Section for evaluation.  The images are saved for 7-30 days.  If an operator observes a 
suspicious person checking car doors, the operator dispatches police to prevent the crime 
rather than waiting for the offense to occur.  State and local laws apply to CCTV 
operations.  Private agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are not required to register 
with any government agency in the jurisdiction.  Enforcement of the written policy 
prevents abuse.  The department has not received any complaints from the public 
regarding the use of its cameras.  Recorded images have been used in prosecutions for 
criminal behavior. 
 
M. MIDDLETOWN (CT) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for six years and 
the operation includes more than forty cameras.  The cameras were installed at locations 
based on crime data.  The system is passively monitored and operates on a 24/7 basis.  A 
written policy for operations does not exist.  The community was involved in both the 
initial and subsequent implementation process.  CCTV operators do not receive special 
training.  Constant supervision does not exist for CCTV operations.  Any requests for 
images are forwarded to the Chief for evaluation.  The images are saved for 30 days.  If 
an operator observes a suspicious person checking car doors, the operator dispatches 
police to prevent the crime rather than waiting for the offense to occur.  No state or local 
laws apply to CCTV operations.  Private agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are 
not required to register with any government agency in the jurisdiction.  Controlling 
access to the video center prevents abuse.  The department has not received any 
complaints from the public regarding the use of its cameras.  Recorded images have been 
used in prosecutions for criminal behavior. 
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N. MIDDLETOWN (NY) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for twenty-five 
years and the operation includes approximately thirty cameras.  The cameras were 
installed at locations based on crime data.  The system is actively monitored and operates 
on a 24/7 basis.  A written policy for operations entitled Public Camera Policy and 
Procedure and dated November 11, 2004 can be found on the agency website 
(http://www.middletownpolice.com/cameramain.html) and includes the following 
elements: 
• The system does not intrude upon an individual’s sphere of privacy, but 
rather records events occurring in public space  
• A warrant must be obtained in order to secretly intercept oral communications 
• The department will comply with all local, federal and case law applicable 
to the use of surveillance cameras in public space 
• Deviation from the policy’s listed principles for inappropriate reasons is 
strictly prohibited 
• Monitoring and recording will be conducted in professional, ethical and 
legal manner 
• Personnel using the camera system will be appropriately trained and supervised 
• Violations of the policy will result in disciplinary action 
• Information obtained through video monitoring and recording will be used 
exclusively for safety, security, and other legitimate purposes 
• Information obtained through monitoring and recording will only be 
released in accordance with the policy 
• Monitoring and recording based solely on characteristics and 
classifications such as race, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, etc. 
is prohibited 
• Monitoring of public areas, swellings, and businesses is limited to uses 
that do not violate the reasonable expectation of privacy 
• The department will maintain a copy of the policy and list of camera 
locations on the official web site 
• Personnel assigned to system operation will be trained in the technical, 
legal and ethical parameters of appropriate camera use 
• Personnel will provide written acknowledgement indicating that they 
received a copy and understand the policy 
• The Chief of Police will conduct periodic audits of the CCTV camera system 
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• The Officer in Charge of the patrol shift will be responsible for the 
CCTV operation 
• Any view provided by a CCTV camera shall be no greater than what is 
available form the public sidewalk 
• Personnel will not continuously view or record people displaying affection 
in public areas, unless such activity is criminal in nature 
• Images will be stored for a maximum of 15 days 
• Storing images beyond the 15 day maximum must be authorized by the 
Chief of Police and may be done for evidentiary (criminal or civil), 
investigation of wrongdoing on the part of police or other bona fide use 
• Only trained Bureau Commanders or staff authorized by the Chief of 
Police shall be authorized to extract video footage from the system 
• Images extracted from the system will be stored in a manner that will 
exclude access by unauthorized personnel  
The community was involved in both the initial and subsequent implementation 
process.  CCTV operators do not receive special training.  Constant supervision does not 
exist for CCTV operations.  Any requests for images are handled in compliance with the 
Freedom of Information Act.  The images are saved for 14 days.  If an operator observes 
a suspicious person checking car doors, the operator dispatches police to prevent the 
crime rather than waiting for the offense to occur.  There are New York State laws that 
apply to CCTV operations.  Private agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are not 
required to register with any government agency in the jurisdiction.  Random checks by a 
supervisor prevent abuse.  The department has not received any complaints from the 
public regarding the use of its cameras.  Recorded images have been used in prosecutions 
for criminal behavior. 
 
O. MINNEAPOLIS (MN) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for one year and 
the operation includes approximately thirty cameras.  The cameras were installed at 
locations based on crime data.  The system is both passively and actively monitored and 
operates on a 24/7 basis.  A written policy for operations does not exist.  The community 
was not involved in the initial or subsequent implementation process.  CCTV operators 
do not receive special training.  Constant supervision does not exist for CCTV operations.  
Any requests for images are forwarded to the Chief for evaluation.  The images are saved 
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for 14 days.  If an operator observes a suspicious person checking car doors, the operator 
dispatches police to prevent the crime rather than waiting for the offense to occur.  No 
state or local laws apply to CCTV operations.  Private agencies wishing to utilize CCTV 
systems are not required to register with any government agency in the jurisdiction.  
Controlling access to the video center prevents abuse.  The department has not received 
any complaints from the public regarding the use of its cameras.  Recorded images have 
been used in prosecutions for criminal behavior. 
 
P. NEW YORK (NY) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for five years and 
the operation includes more than one hundred cameras.  The cameras were installed at 
locations based on crime data and input from the Housing Authority.  The system is 
actively monitored and operates on a 24/7 basis.  A written policy for operations does 
exist but was unavailable for review.  The community was not involved in the initial or 
subsequent implementation process.  CCTV operators do not receive special training.  
Constant supervision does not exist for CCTV operations.  Any requests for images are 
forwarded to the District Attorney for evaluation.  The images are saved for 7-10 days.  If 
an operator observes a suspicious person checking car doors, the operator dispatches 
police to prevent the crime rather than waiting for the offense to occur.  The contact 
person did not know if any state or local laws apply to CCTV operations or if private 
agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are required to register with any government 
agency in the jurisdiction.  Strong supervision prevents abuse.  The department has had 
complaints from the public regarding the use of its cameras.  Recorded images have been 
used in prosecutions for criminal behavior. 
 
Q. REYNOLDSBURG SCHOOL DISTRICT (REYNOLDSBURG, OH) 
The school district has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for three years 
and the operation includes more than one hundred fifty cameras.  The cameras were 
installed at locations based on input from school staff.  The system is passively monitored 
and operates on a 24/7 basis.  A written policy for operations does not exist.  The 
community was not involved in the initial or subsequent implementation process.  CCTV 
operators receive special training.  Constant supervision does not exist for CCTV 
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operations.  Any request for images will be granted.  The images are saved for 14 days.  
If an operator observes a suspicious person checking car doors, the operator dispatches 
police to prevent the crime rather than waiting for the offense to occur.  State law does 
apply to CCTV operations.  Private agencies are required to register with a government 
agency in the jurisdiction.  Controlling access to the video center prevents abuse.  The 
school district has not received any complaints from the public regarding the use of its 
cameras.  Recorded images have been used in prosecutions for criminal behavior. 
 
R. ST. PETERSBURG, (FL) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for fifteen years 
and the operation includes more than fifteen cameras.  The cameras were installed at 
locations determined by CALEA guidelines.  The system is passively monitored and 
operates on a 24/7 basis.  A written policy for operations does not exist.  The community 
was not involved in the initial and subsequent implementation process.  The only training 
available for CCTV operators is on-the-job training.  Constant supervision does not exist 
for CCTV operations.  Any requests for images are handled in accordance with the 
Sunshine Laws.  The images are saved for 30 days.  If an operator observes a suspicious 
person checking car doors, the operator dispatches police to prevent the crime rather than 
waiting for the offense to occur.  No state or local laws apply to CCTV operations.  
Private agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are not required to register with any 
government agency in the jurisdiction.  Controlling access to the video center prevents 
abuse.  The department has not received any complaints from the public regarding the use 
of its cameras.  Recorded images have not yet been used in any prosecutions for criminal 
behavior. 
 
S. TAMPA (FL) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for ten years and 
the operation includes more than ten cameras.  The cameras were installed at locations 
based on crime data.  The system is actively monitored and operates on a 24/7 basis.  A 
written policy for operations does not exist.  The community was involved in the initial 
and subsequent implementation process.  Special training is initially provided for the 
CCTV operators and a mandatory refresher course is scheduled yearly.  Constant 
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supervision does exist for CCTV operations.  Any requests for images are handled in 
accordance with the Sunshine Laws.  Daily images are saved for 30 days and special 
events for 1 year.  If an operator observes a suspicious person checking car doors, the 
operator would permit the offense to occur before dispatching police.  No state or local 
laws apply to CCTV operations.  Private agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are 
not required to register with any government agency in the jurisdiction.  Close 
supervision prevents abuse.  The department has received 2-3 civil right claims regarding 
the use of its cameras.  Recorded images have been used in prosecutions for criminal 
behavior. 
 
T. TRIMET TRANSIT POLICE DEPARTMENT (PORTLAND, OR) 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for more than 
fifteen years and the operation includes more than 2500 cameras.  The cameras were 
installed at locations determined by an engineering consultant.  The system is passively 
monitored and operates on a 24/7 basis.  A written policy entitled Information 
Technology: CCTV Use and dated May 5, 2005, does exist for CCTV operations and 
includes the following elements: 
• Personal use of the system is strictly prohibited 
• Adjustments to aim, direction or focus, and the creation of any recorded 
images must be authorized by a supervisor or manager 
• Use of CCTV technology is not personal or private 
• Employees may only review, record, download or transmit images if 
included within assigned duties or as specifically directed by a supervisor 
or manager 
• Access to CCTV technology may only be permitted to authorized users 
• No outside disclosure or transmittal of CCTV is permitted without the 
prior authorization of a manager 
• CCTV images may be used for risk identification and avoidance, claims 
processing, law enforcement and general safety and security purposes 
• Image use for training purposes must be authorized by a manager and 
legal counsel 
• Employees should not aim, direct or focus a CCTV camera onto property 
adjacent to a TriMet facility unless exigent circumstances exist and a 
supervisor/manager authorizes such action 
42 
• Employees may not aim, direct or focus CCTV cameras on or into 
businesses, homes, apartments, vehicles or any other similar private, non-
public space, except to track a fleeing criminal when requested by law 
enforcement and authorized by a manger/supervisor 
• Requests for historical data must be made to the system director 
• Cameras have a “home” view and if they are moved from the that view 
they must be returned as promptly as possible 
• Employees are not to show images to an employee involved in an incident 
before that involved employee files a written report describing the incident 
• Employees are required to review and sign a form indicating an 
understanding of the agency’s policies and training 
The community was not involved in the initial and subsequent implementation 
process.  CCTV operators receive special training.  Constant supervision does exist for 
CCTV operations.  Any requests for images are handled in accordance with the public 
records release process.  The images are saved for three years.  If an operator observes a 
suspicious person checking car doors, the operator would dispatch police to prevent the 
crime rather than waiting for the offense to occur.  The contact person did not know if 
any state or local laws apply to CCTV operations or if private agencies wishing to utilize 
CCTV systems are required to register with any government agency in the jurisdiction.  
Close supervision prevents abuse.  The department has not received any complaints from 
the public regarding the use of its cameras.  Recorded images have been used in 
prosecutions for criminal behavior (including two homicides). 
 
U. UNITED STATES MARSHAL’S OFFICE – TULSA, OKLAHOMA 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for twenty years 
and the operation includes more than thirty cameras.  The cameras were installed at 
locations chosen by the department.  The system is actively monitored and operates on a 
24/7 basis.  A written policy exists for cell block operations but not for public domain 
surveillance.  The community was not involved in the initial or subsequent 
implementation process.  The only training available for the CCTV operators is on-the-
job training.  Constant supervision only occurs during normal business hours.  Any 
requests for images are forwarded to the Chief Deputy for evaluation.  The images are 
saved for 14 days.  If an operator observes a suspicious person checking car doors, the 
operator dispatches police to prevent the crime rather than waiting for the offense to 
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occur.  No state or local laws apply to Federal CCTV operations.  Private agencies 
wishing to utilize CCTV systems are not required to register with any government agency 
in the jurisdiction.  Controlling access to the video center prevents abuse.  The 
department has not received any complaints from the public regarding the use of its 
cameras.  Although recorded images have not yet been used in any prosecutions for 
criminal behavior, they have been used in several employee discipline cases. 
 
V. UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS – KANSAS CITY CAMPUS POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for thirty years and 
the operation includes more than one-hundred cameras.  The cameras were installed to 
view points of ingress and egress on designated secure buildings. The system is passively 
monitored and operates on a 24/7 basis.  A written policy for operations entitled Closed 
Circuit Television Policy can be found on the agency website 
(http://www.kumc.edu/police/cctvhast.html) and includes the following elements: 
• The system is designed to supplement patrols of police and security officers 
• Cameras provide deterrent value and greater surveillance 
• Cameras are to be used to provide real time information during 
emergencies 
• Images are maintained for at least 30 days 
• Cameras may or may not be monitored on a continuous basis 
• There are no “dummy” cameras in the system.   
The community was not involved in the initial or subsequent implementation 
process.  There is no special training for the department’s CCTV operators.  Constant 
supervision does not exist for CCTV operations.  Any requests for images are forwarded 
to the University’s legal section for review.  The images are saved for approximately 30-
45 days.  If an operator observes a suspicious person checking car doors, the operator 
dispatches police to prevent a crime rather than wait until the offense occurs.  No state or 
local laws apply to CCTV operations.  Private agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems 




supervision prevents abuse.  The department has not received any complaints from the 
public regarding the use of its cameras.  Recorded images have been used in prosecutions 
for criminal behavior. 
 
W. VIRGINIA BEACH (VA) POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The department has been utilizing CCTV surveillance systems for ten years and 
the operation includes more than ten cameras.  The cameras were installed at locations 
based on crime data.  The system is passively monitored and operates on a 24/7 basis.  A 
written policy for operations does not exist.  The contact persons did not know if the 
community was involved in the initial implementation process.  CCTV operators do not 
receive any special training.  Constant supervision does not exist for CCTV operations.  
Any requests for images are forwarded to the Internal Affairs Bureau for evaluation.  The 
images are saved for 60 days.    If an operator observes a suspicious person checking car 
doors, the operator dispatches police to prevent the crime rather than waiting for the 
offense to occur.  State and local laws do not apply to CCTV operations.  The contact 
person did not know if private agencies wishing to utilize CCTV systems are required to 
register with any government agency in the jurisdiction.  Controlling access to the video 
center prevents abuse.  The department has not had any complaints from the public 







Agency How long has agency had CCTV?
How many 
cameras are in the 
system? 




Alexandria (VA) PD 18 years >60 Security consultant 
Anchorage (AK) PD 10 + years 6 Crime data based 
Atlanta (GA) PD 1 year >30 Based on funding sources 




10 + years >80 School staff input 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg 
(NC) PD 15 years >100 Crime data based 
Chicago (IL) PD 2 ½ years >100 Crime data based 
Dallas (TX) PD 2 ½ years >80 Crime data based 
Fresno (CA) PD <1 year >30 Crime data based 
Honolulu (HI) PD 10 + years >20 Crime data based 









Agency How long has agency had CCTV? 
How many 
cameras are in the 
system? 




Los Angeles (CA) 
PD 3 years >50 Crime data based 
Middletown (CT) PD 6 years >40 Crime data based 
Middletown (NY) PD 25 years App 30 Crime data based 
Minneapolis (MN) 
PD 1 year App 30 Crime data based 




3 years >150 School staff input 
St. Petersburg (FL) 
PD 15 years >15 
CALEA 
guidelines 
Tampa (FL) PD 10 years >10 Crime data based 
TriMet Transit Police  
(Portland, OR) 15 + years App 2500 
Engineering 
consultant 
University of Kansas 
PD (Kansas City 
Campus) 
30 years >100 
View points of 
ingress and egress 
to secure buildings 
US Marshals Service 
Tulsa, OK 20 years >30 Crime data based 
Virginia Beach (VA) 
PD 10 years >10 Crime data based 












Does agency have 
a written CCTV 
policy? 
Alexandria (VA) PD Actively Yes Unknown 
Anchorage (AK) PD Passively Yes No 
Atlanta (GA) PD Passively Yes No 




Passively Yes No 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg 
(NC) PD Actively Yes No 
Chicago (IL) PD Actively Yes Yes 
Dallas (TX) PD Passively Yes No 
Fresno (CA) PD Actively Yes No 
Honolulu (HI) PD Passively Yes Yes 
Little Rock (AR) PD Passively Yes No 












Does agency have 
a written CCTV 
policy? 
Los Angeles (CA) 
PD Both Yes Yes 
Middletown (CT) PD Passively Yes No 
Middletown (NY) PD Actively Yes Yes 
Minneapolis (MN) 
PD Both Yes No 




Passively Yes No 
St. Petersburg (FL) 
PD Passively Yes No 
Tampa (FL) PD Actively Yes No 
TriMet Transit Police  
(Portland, OR) Passively Yes No 
University of Kansas 
PD (Kansas City 
Campus) 
Passively Yes Yes 
US Marshals Service 
Tulsa, OK Actively Yes No 
Virginia Beach (VA) 
PD Passively Yes No 







have input during 
implementation? 
Is there special 
training for CCTV 
operators? 




Alexandria (VA) PD No No No 
Anchorage (AK) PD No No No 
Atlanta (GA) PD No No No 




No Yes No 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg 
(NC) PD No Yes Yes 
Chicago (IL) PD No Yes No 
Dallas (TX) PD No Training by vendor Yes 
Fresno (CA) PD Yes No Yes 
Honolulu (HI) PD No Yes Yes 








have input during 
implementation? 
Is there special 
training for CCTV 
operators? 




Los Angeles (CA) 
PD Yes 30 minutes Yes 
Middletown (CT) PD Yes No No 
Middletown (NY) PD Yes No No 
Minneapolis (MN) 
PD No No No 




No Yes No 
St. Petersburg (FL) 
PD No No No 
Tampa (FL) PD Yes Yes/annual refresher Yes 
TriMet Transit Police  
(Portland, OR) No Yes Yes 
University of Kansas 
PD (Kansas City 
Campus) 
No No No 
US Marshals Service 
Tulsa, OK No No 
Business hours 
only 
Virginia Beach (VA) 
PD Unknown No No 






How is decision 
made regarding 
release of images? 
How long are 
images saved? 




Alexandria (VA) PD Division Chief evaluates Unknown Evidence 
Anchorage (AK) PD Chief evaluates Indefinitely Prevention 
Atlanta (GA) PD Public Affairs evaluates 90 days Evidence 




Written request 14 days Prevention 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg 
(NC) PD Chief evaluates 3-5 days Prevention 
Chicago (IL) PD Chief Evaluates 72 hours Prevention 
Dallas (TX) PD FOIA process 60-90 days Prevention 
Fresno (CA) PD Not developed yet Not developed yet Prevention 
Honolulu (HI) PD Legal Section evaluates 7 days Evidence 







How is decision 
made regarding 
release of images? 
How long are 
images saved? 




Los Angeles (CA) 
PD 
Legal Section 
evaluates 7-30 days Prevention 
Middletown (CT) PD Chief evaluates 30 days Prevention 
Middletown (NY) PD FOIA process 14 days Prevention 
Minneapolis (MN) 
PD Chief evaluates 14 days Prevention 




All requests granted 14 days Prevention 
St. Petersburg (FL) 
PD FOIA process 30 days Prevention 
Tampa (FL) PD FOIA process 30 days/special events – 1 yr Evidence 
TriMet Transit Police  
(Portland, OR) 
In accordance with 
public records 
release process 
3 years Prevention 
University of Kansas 
PD (Kansas City 
Campus) 
Legal Department 
evaluates 30-45 days Prevention 
US Marshals Service 
Tulsa, OK 
Chief Deputy 
evaluates 14 days Prevention 
Virginia Beach (VA) 
PD 
Processed through 
IA 60 days Prevention 






Do any state or 
local laws exist 
regulating CCTV? 




How is abuse 
prevented? 
Alexandria (VA) PD Unknown Yes, with the state Adherence to written policy 
Anchorage (AK) PD No No Controlled access to video center 
Atlanta (GA) PD No No 
Controlled access 
to video center and 
monitoring of 
operators 




Unknown No None 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg 
(NC) PD No No 
Limited access to 
system 




Dallas (TX) PD No No Controlled access to video center 
Fresno (CA) PD Unknown No Controlled access to video center 
Honolulu (HI) PD No No Close supervision 







Do any state or 
local laws exist 
regulating CCTV? 




How is abuse 
prevented? 
Los Angeles (CA) 
PD No No Policy guidelines 
Middletown (CT) PD No No Controlled access to video center 
Middletown (NY) PD State law  No Random checks by supervisor 
Minneapolis (MN) 
PD No No 
Controlled access 
to video center 




State law Yes Controlled access to video center 
St. Petersburg (FL) 
PD No No 
Controlled access 
to video center 
Tampa (FL) PD No No Close supervision 
TriMet Transit Police  
(Portland, OR) Unknown Unknown Close supervision 
University of Kansas 
PD (Kansas City 
Campus) 
No No Close supervision 
US Marshals Service 
Tulsa, OK No No 
Controlled access 
to video center 
Virginia Beach (VA) 
PD No Unknown 
Controlled access 
to video center 






Have any complaints been 
received regarding 
CCTV? 
Have images been 
successfully used in 
prosecution? 
Alexandria (VA) PD No No 
Anchorage (AK) PD No No 
Atlanta (GA) PD No Yes, more than 12 
Baltimore (MD) PD No Yes 
Centennial School District 
(Portland, OR) No Yes 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg (NC) 
PD No Yes 
Chicago (IL) PD No Yes 
Dallas (TX) PD No No 
Fresno (CA) PD No No 
Honolulu (HI) PD No Yes 







Have any complaints been 
received regarding 
CCTV? 
Have images been 
successfully used in 
prosecution? 
Los Angeles (CA) PD No Yes 
Middletown (CT) PD No Yes 
Middletown (NY) PD No Yes 
Minneapolis (MN) PD No Yes 
New York (NY) PD Yes Yes 
Reynoldsburg School 
District (Reynoldsburg, OH) No Yes 
St. Petersburg (FL) PD No No 
Tampa (FL) PD Yes/2-3 civil rights claims Yes 
TriMet Transit Police  
(Portland, OR) No Yes – including 2 murders 
University of Kansas PD 
(Kansas City Campus) No Yes 
US Marshals Service Tulsa, 
OK No Employee discipline only 
Virginia Beach (VA) PD No Yes 




Homeland Security professionals are utilizing public domain surveillance systems 
to protect critical infrastructures and institute a protective electronic net over society.  
Although CCTV’s usefulness as a post incident investigative tool remains its most 
appealing characteristic, public safety professionals are eager to obtain these systems 
under the guise of incident prevention.  Even as millions of dollars are earmarked for this 
technology, standardized measures and legal standards have not been implemented to 
prevent abuse.  Actual or perceived abuse has the potential to destroy society’s faith in 
the positive use of video surveillance systems.   The research conducted for this thesis 
netted several methods of preventing abuse.  This chapter presents step by step methods 
for administrators to adopt in order to maintain the fragile balance between public safety 
needs and privacy expectations. 
 
A. IS CCTV THE BEST SOLUTION FOR THE PROBLEM? 
When deciding whether a jurisdiction would benefit from the implementation of 
CCTV surveillance systems, several questions must be considered.  Crucial in abuse 
prevention, this stage should determine if video surveillance can be effective in 
addressing a specifically identified problem.  If a system does not have a high probability 
of succeeding in its stated purpose then it will face the chance of being used for 
unintended purposes.  Those unintended purposes may involve voyeurism, racial 
profiling, labor rule enforcement or infringement upon the 1st and 4th Amendment rights. 
A multi-discipline evaluation group should be established using representatives 
from the police, homeland security, emergency management, academic, legal, political, 
business, civic, religious, civil liberties protection, and technical field of video 
surveillance.  The consortium should determine if introducing surveillance systems to the 
public domain would be the most appropriate course of action for the problem in that 
jurisdiction.  Consideration should be directed at whether other problem solving methods 
would be more effective and/or more efficient.  When considering possible alternatives to 
surveillance systems for Homeland Security issues, several possibilities should be 
examined.  The initiation of town watch programs, improved lighting, hardening of 
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potential targets, integrating private security with public safety, restricting access to 
specific areas, and redeployment of police resources are all possible alternatives to 
surveillance systems tasked with protecting the public domain and critical infrastructure 
locations.  
The group should examine research conducted on addressing the criminal or 
homeland security issue that has prompted the recommendation for CCTV surveillance.  
Studies completed in other jurisdictions may provide the group with a different 
perspective on solving the problem.  The research may also provide valuable data to 
support the proposed introduction of video surveillance for the public domain.  Another 
question that should be answered by research is whether or not the system will be able to 
maintain operation for an extended period of time.  Sustainability has been the downfall 
of several system applications throughout the country.  If manpower commitments or 
funding sources cannot be guaranteed for the project then it may be doomed before it 
begins.   
 
B. CAMERA PLACEMENT 
Once CCTV technology is selected as the best platform for launching an attack on 
a public safety threat, administrators must then decide where the cameras should be 
installed, as well as what areas will be observed by government authorities.  The review 
of police systems in the United States revealed an overwhelming reliance on crime data 
to determine placement of surveillance cameras.  Very few jurisdictions used community 
input, hazard analysis of critical infrastructures, or guidance from Homeland Security 
professionals to assist in the decision making process.  By incorporating these additional 
viewpoints, the system can be multifaceted, gain resources from other disciplines and 
qualify for funding that encourages collaborative efforts.  
Every city has formal and informal organizations that include business, civic, 
professional, educational, religious, political, and labor groups.  Each of these groups 
should be urged to provide their input in order to assist CCTV administrators in deciding 
what areas require observation.  This outreach by the system administrators will result in 
support for the program and ground level intelligence.  The importance of inviting non- 
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law enforcement entities into the development of the program cannot be underestimated.  
Involvement by these groups will net huge results exhibited by fresh ideas and program 
buy-in.  
Crime data should be reviewed longitudinally to establish historical patterns.  The 
information should then be evaluated to ascertain whether video surveillance can assist in 
preventing future offenses.  If the function of the system targets homeland security issues, 
crime prevention should be considered as a secondary purpose.  By including crime 
prevention goals for the system, the presentation to convince city leaders of the system’s 
value becomes stronger and more diverse.  Additionally, utilizing the video technology to 
address crime issues hones the skills of the camera operators so that when a homeland 
security danger presents itself, the operators will be well practiced and confident in their 
response.  
Most cities utilize their surveillance systems primarily for engaging the common 
street criminal.  A clear need exists to factor in elements that could broaden the horizons 
of the technology.  By blending in the goals of other disciplines focused on homeland 
security, system administrators can improve investigative capabilities, detect terrorist pre-
planning, and thwart attacks before they occur.  
Hazard analysis for critical infrastructure locations has occurred in most of 
America’s major cities.  A variety of mathematical means exist to analyze the threat to 
facilities that could affect services, economy and the continuity of government for the 
jurisdiction.  If a critical infrastructure hazard analysis has not been conducted, an 
accepted method of prioritizing importance should be executed.  The results should then 
be used to gauge where CCTV surveillance could best serve the public safety mission.  
By utilizing mapping software, authorities can visualize the hazard analysis results and 
avoid camera coverage duplication. 
The review conducted of agencies utilizing CCTV surveillance in the United 
States revealed that 70% of departments used crime data as the main factor in the 




                                                
and communities funding camera costs guided 8% of the departments.  Consultants 
assisted 8% of the departments.  Critical infrastructure assessments directed 8% of the 
departments.  
 
C. PUBLIC NOTIFICATION 
CCTV effectiveness studies show that the deterrence effect occurs when two 
elements exist: 1) adequate signage and 2) swift response to suspicious behavior.     
Deterrence affects the criminal mindset.  Minimizing secrecy and instituting adequate 
abuse prevention controls increases faith in government.  It is imperative that public 
meetings be held prior to introducing CCTV technology to monitor the public domain.  In 
the article, “Closed Circuit Television Looking Out for You,” published by the British 
Government, CCTV administrators are advised to carefully plan and competently manage 
the systems to prevent actual or perceived abuse.81  Concerns regarding civil liberties 
must be adequately addressed before CCTV can be successfully introduced to the public 
domain. 
Once a decision has been made to utilize CCTV surveillance, extensive media 
coverage should be encouraged.  City residents should understand the purpose of the 
system, be introduced to its manager, be aware of the steps being taken to prevent abuse, 
and know the procedure for filing complaints.  Residents and visitors should be able to 
easily determine the general areas of video monitoring.  Whenever the technology results 
in specific incidents indicating success, the examples should be publicized.  
Highly visible signs should be posted on the perimeter of zones subject to video 
surveillance.  In a survey conducted in Great Britain during 2004, the participants felt 
strongly that signage should alert people to ongoing CCTV surveillance.  This step 
constitutes the deterrence element of video technology.  The only way that wrongdoing 
can be avoided lies in the criminal element thinking that their actions will be detected, 
recorded, and used for prosecution.  
Several jurisdictions have systems funded completely by community groups or 
local corporations.  Since funding in Atlanta (GA) originated from the business 
community, the camera system focused on the commercial district.  Little Rock (AR) 
 
81 Edwards and Tilley, “Closed Circuit Television Looking Out For You.”   
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received its funding from neighborhood associations that enabled video surveillance of 
the areas represented by the donating organizations.  The same applied to Los Angeles 
(CA) which received partial financial assistance from private entities.  Municipalities 
permitting donations to fund CCTV surveillance systems inevitably require camera 
coverage of the benefactor’s neighborhood.  Funding partnerships should result in 
collaboration between community and government interests when it comes to the 
placement of surveillance cameras.  
A careful balance must be struck between full disclosure of camera locations and 
maintaining operational secrecy for homeland security functions.  Jurisdictions should 
beware of requiring all camera locations to be publicly known.  There may be cause at a 
later time to install video surveillance tasked with observing critical infrastructure 
locations.  Enemies should not be able to easily obtain the locations of some surveillance 
cameras.  The answer to this conundrum may be to use citizen input to assist in 
prioritizing locations desirous for surveillance coverage but to maintain secrecy regarding 
the actual locations of the camera pods.  
In Philadelphia (PA), City Councilman Darrell Clarke has responded to the debate 
regarding whether municipalities should have government operated CCTV surveillance 
systems by suggesting that the citizens decide the matter for the elected officials.  He has 
urged that a question be placed on the ballot during the next election asking people 
whether they support the use of such technology for public domain monitoring.  This 
method may be the most accurate means available to garner a true picture of whether 
citizens in a particular jurisdiction support the use of a potentially invasive technology in 
their neighborhoods. 
The review conducted of agencies utilizing CCTV surveillance in the United 
States revealed that 65% of the departments did not seek input from the community prior 
to implementation of CCTV for the public domain.  Several jurisdictions created 
community advisory groups to assist law enforcement in the introduction of this 
technology.  One significant use of external groups as advisors occurred in the City of 
Los Angeles.  Prior to implementation, input was sought from the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU). 
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D. REGISTERING PRIVATE CAMERA SYSTEMS 
The cost of implementing electronic homeland security grids protecting our 
nation’s cities continues to be overwhelming.  While local governments struggle to 
muster the financing necessary to install, operate and manage CCTV platforms, private 
entities have fully functioning systems already in use.  Many of those systems observe 
public areas in their quest to protect private property or while monitoring the actions of 
the company’s employees.  Any system that views public areas should be required to 
submit to an established registration and standardization process.  
Registering privately owned camera systems accomplishes two goals.  The first is 
government’s responsibility to protect the privacy expectations of society.  The 
registration process should include a presentation to a government approved panel that 
would decide the merit and need for a system to observe the public in its daily routines.  
The presentation would answer questions such as: what will the system be used to watch, 
why does company management feel that this technology is the best method to address 
the problem, how will abuse be prevented, will the images be recorded, how long will 
images be saved, what will the procedure be for approving the release of images, and 
who will be the manager for the system.  Advising private entities of the regulations 
established to control CCTV surveillance systems serves as the second goal of 
registration.  
A technology approval panel should be created by the local government in order 
to review registration requests by private entities.  The panel should determine whether 
the intended function of the system protects privacy expectations and meets 
standardization requirements.  Registration renewal should be a yearly occurrence that 
reviews whether the system’s effectiveness warrants continued operation.  The process 
should also serve as a procedures refresher for the system administrator.  
The registration process should include the geographic area that each privately 
operated camera spans.  By providing this information, the public safety professionals 
will have the ability to create a map that indicates what cameras are monitoring public 
areas.  This information can then be used in criminal and terrorism investigations.  This 
process will also assist surveillance system administrators in deciding where to install 
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cameras as funding becomes available.  Rather than duplicating coverage already in 
place, government cameras can be focused on areas that have no CCTV monitoring.  
The review conducted of agencies utilizing CCTV surveillance in the United 
States revealed that only 8% of the jurisdictions required registration, certification or 
licensing for privately operated CCTV surveillance systems.  Ohio requires licensing and 
Virginia demands certification.  Maryland regulates private security companies using 
surveillance systems.  Los Angeles (CA) plans on developing a registration process, but it 
is not in place at this time. 
 
E. MECHANIZING SURVEILLANCE CAMERA OPERATION 
As technology improves, software and hardware enable video surveillance that 
minimizes the opportunities for abuse.  London’s digital camera system known as the 
“Ring of Steel” allows counter terrorism specialists to record the license plate of every 
vehicle entering the city.  While the system records the tag numbers of all vehicles, it also 
analyzes each tag using automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) software.82   The 
London operation functions without the need for camera operators.  Another software 
package can be programmed to identify special patterns of movement or entry into secure 
areas.  Once the system identified a movement pre-designated as suspicious, a 
notification would be sent to a human operator who could then manually conduct an 
investigation using the appropriate camera.83  Chicago (IL) has computer operated CCTV 
surveillance cameras that notify police when persons are identified as loitering near 
critical infrastructure locations, parking vehicles in restricted areas or leaving packages 
unattended.84  
Disciplines other than law enforcement have introduced surveillance camera 
technologies that can be applied to homeland security intelligence gathering efforts.  In 
Sacramento (CA), parking enforcement units use license plate recognition software to 
record every license tag that the camera observes, note its geographic position, and 
 
82 McCahill and Norris, “CCTV in Britain,” 24. 
83 Irish Independent, “Why there’s no magic shield against terror,” July 16, 2005, 
http://www.independent.co.uk [Accessed July 2005].    
84 PoliceOne.com,“Chicago Moving to ‘Smart’ Surveillance Cameras,” (September 22, 2004), 
http://www.policeone.com/policeone/frontend/parser.cfm?object=News&operation=full_news&id=92023 
[Accessed July 2005].  
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analyze the tag.  The parking authority utilizes the video equipment to determine if the 
vehicle has remained parked beyond the legal limit or if it is reported stolen.85  The same 
data and images could be used by homeland security intelligence analysts to identify the 
vehicles of subjects on watch lists and other suspect modes of transportation.  This 
information gathering mission can occur without human manipulation of the images. 
Police agencies such as East Orange (NJ) and the University of Pennsylvania 
utilize software that automatically block out windows, fenced in yards and other 
specifically identified locations.  These types of software remove the possibility of 
camera operators using the video equipment to view areas that have an expectation of 
privacy.  
Many law enforcement systems use automatically scanning cameras that 
continuously record and store images.  The capability exists to flag any manual override 
that occurs.  If an operator who is expected to monitor automatically scanning or fixed 
cameras commands the equipment to view areas that are in conflict with the programmed 
system, a supervisor receives notification of the override.  This permits the supervisor to 
view the segment of video that was generated by the operator. 
 
F. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 
Adequate controls remain the most important link between the community’s faith 
in their government and successful implementation of CCTV surveillance systems for the 
public domain.  People want to believe that government agents will act in a manner that 
protects civil liberties.  If incidents occur in which trusted persons violate the social 
contract between government and its citizens, controversial technologies will be rejected.  
Administrative controls must be established to protect the citizens, program and system.  
The following elements can provide the foundation for controlling behavior of employees 
and prevent mistakes that result in organizational embarrassment. 
• Adequate supervision – strong supervision should always be present 
whenever surveillance camera operations are activated 
• Specific administrator – one management employee should be designated 
as the person responsible for CCTV operations and be held personally 
accountable for the actions of the surveillance system employees  
 
85 Merrill Douglas, “Parking Spotter,” Government Technology Magazine (June 27, 2005): 68. 
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• Limited access – the video control room should be off limits to all 
unauthorized personnel 
• Privacy separation – the video control room must be physically 
separated from all other functions to ensure privacy and protect the 
integrity of the operation 
• Control log – a log should be maintained at the video control center 
indicating the employees and supervisors working each shift; documenting 
any unusual incidents; recording reasons for manual overrides of cameras; 
noting requests for information or copies of images; listing of all persons 
gaining access to the video center   
• Confidentiality agreement – all operators should be required to sign an 
agreement acknowledging an understanding of the operational policies, 
image release standards and behavior requirements 
• Custody chain – recorded images must be handled in a manner to prevent 
challenge to their authenticity; procedures should be initiated to maintain 
security of the DVD, hard drive or other storage format; and the number of 
persons handling the recorded images should be kept to a strict minimum 
• Electronic protection – recording formats should have watermarking, 
encryption or some other technological method of verifying video authenticity 
• Written policy – as with all other important programs instituted within an 
organization, the guidelines must be known to the employees in order to 
reduce liability and provide direction 
The review conducted of agencies utilizing CCTV surveillance in the United 
States revealed that 30% of the jurisdictions activate strong on-scene supervision 
whenever CCTV surveillance operates.  Many of the departments limit access to the 
video control center as a method to prevent abuse.  Of the agencies surveyed, only 
TriMet Transit and the Middletown (NY) Police Departments  require its employees to 
sign a confidentiality agreement restricting release of images.  Shockingly, only 26% of 
the departments have issued a written policy detailing the guidelines to be followed while 
using the technology.                   
 
G. CREATION OF LEGISLATION 
Legislative bodies have exhibited tremendous reluctance to create laws limiting 
CCTV surveillance system operations.  The threat of terrorism and urban crime has 
generated a blind eye to the need for regulations.  The average American wants 
Homeland Security professionals to have the authority to utilize technology in its efforts 
to protect society.  Unfortunately, legal standards are often implemented in response to an 
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abuse that becomes publicized.  The knee-jerk reaction can result in overzealous controls 
that limit the ability of well intentioned public safety professionals.  The need for 
reasonable legislation that regulates use and protects images prevents such overreactions.  
By collaborating with legislators before an abuse occurs, homeland security officials can 
mold the legal standards to assist them in their mission and to encourage positive 
professional behavior. 
When in-car video (ICV) became a common equipment addition for police 
vehicles, states instituted legal regulations regarding the length of time that images could 
be maintained.  The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania requires that images obtained 
through the use of ICV be maintained no longer than 45 days from the date of recording.  
The exceptions to the time restrictions include evidentiary images, recordings necessary 
for ongoing investigations, and video utilized for training.  The same restrictions 
established for ICV operations should be implemented for CCTV systems. 
While regulations already exist for the maximum amount of time that images may 
be stored, consideration should be given to requiring all CCTV operations—government 
and  private—to save images for a minimum number of days.  If a surveillance system is 
trained on the public domain, the operation should store the images for a minimum of 
seven days in order to allow public safety professionals to determine if those videos can 
be used in their intelligence gathering and crime solving missions.  
Many cities, including Chicago (IL) and Baltimore (MD), utilize video pods 
which are wireless cameras that transmit images via an intranet system.  Since wireless 
systems are susceptible to interception and legislation should be drafted protecting image 
transfer from interference.  At least one organization, the University of Texas (Austin) 
successfully lobbied for a statute that shields the locations of cameras from public 
scrutiny.  Texas law states that “…specifications, operating procedures, or location of a 
security system used to protect public or private property from an act of terrorism or 
related criminal activity is confidential.”86  
The Philadelphia Parking Authority holds the distinction of being an organization 
that successfully convinced a state legislature to create a statute protecting video images 
 
86 TX Stat. Ann. Sec. 418.182 as amended by House Bill 9. 
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from release.  Although the Authority’s cameras focus on traffic enforcement, the law 
can serve as a model for other agencies attempting to control image releases.  Strong 
consideration should be given to enacting legal restrictions to limit private image 
requests.  France prohibits the release of video that could interfere with an individual’s 
personal or financial well being.  
System administrators should understand that recording of public areas will 
undoubtedly result in requests for images to support civil claims related to infidelity, 
vehicle crashes, and workman’s compensation.  By establishing legal guidelines, requests 
will be avoided for images related to civil actions.  The drafting of laws should be 
considered to limit release of video for the following reasons: 
• assist in terrorism/criminal investigations 
• evidentiary in nature 
• training of public safety professionals.   
The review conducted of agencies utilizing CCTV surveillance in the United 
States revealed that legislation regulating surveillance system operations exists in only 
8% of the jurisdictions where CCTV plays a part in the security mission.  Legislation 
should be instituted prohibiting the sale, unauthorized transfer, or possession of 
surveillance system images not obtained in accordance with existing laws and 
regulations.  By doing this, public safety professionals will have enforceable authority to 
address the ever-present temptation to sell images to the print and television tabloids.  
Creating criminal code violations for violating the community’s trust may serve as a 
tremendous deterrent for persons in the position of handling surveillance system images.         
 
H. TRAINING 
CCTV surveillance technology will prompt legal challenges claiming a lack of 
administrative oversight, inadequate training for operators, Constitutional violations and 
privacy infringement.  All of those issues must first be addressed with training.  During 
the implementation phase for surveillance systems scheduled to monitor the public 
domain, training needs to be an integral segment of the plan.  
Regulations should be established limiting the amount of time that operators can 
actively monitor the cameras.  Studies have shown that the effectiveness of the operator 
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diminishes greatly after two hours of continuous monitoring.  Regular personnel rotations 
should be implemented to ensure that operators remain alert and that the goal of the 
system maintained. 
Operators should receive training on the technical application of the system so 
that they understand its capabilities and limitations.  The span of the camera coverage 
should be understood completely by the persons responsible for monitoring so that when 
an incident occurs, the correct camera will be activated.  Additionally, as the potential 
subject moves throughout the grid of coverage, the operators must understand where the 
cameras are located and what areas they view.  
Employees and supervisors should submit to ethical awareness indoctrination so 
that the implications of wrongdoing are clear.  The definitions of improper behavior 
should be outlined and understood.  The existing laws of the jurisdiction should be 
explained along with the department’s individual policies regarding CCTV operations.  
The training should be reinforced with a testing element that can indicate the need for 
further instruction and provide liability defense.  
The review conducted of agencies utilizing CCTV surveillance in the United 
States revealed that a surprisingly low number of police departments provide training 
other than on-the-job for its surveillance camera operators.  Only 30% of the agencies 
have special training sessions for the most crucial hub of the surveillance system – the 
human operators.  The city of Tampa (FL) schedules a yearly refresher course for their 
camera operators.  The seminar focuses on Constitutional issues and protection of 
individual privacy. 
 
I. WRITTEN POLICY 
Although professional organizations recommend publishing written policies 
addressing operational issues, only a very small segment of the surveyed departments 
have done so for CCTV surveillance system functions.  The size of an organization often 
determines the likelihood of written guideline issuance.  In many smaller departments, 
the message from the Chief filters to the line officers with little distortion or 
misinterpretation.  Since larger departments suffer from the “whisper down the lane” 
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syndrome in which the sender’s message frequently does not reflect what the end user 
receives, written policies play an important part in accurately transmitting instructions. 
Regardless of the size of the organization, written policies serve as a valuable 
liability protection plan.  The defense for civil actions lodged against public safety 
officials often hinge on what the employee was directed to do by her supervisors.  
Written policies remove the possibility of misinterpretation or the erroneous claim of a 
lack of direction from management.  When an employee chooses to step outside the 
boundaries of the written guidelines, management maintains a strong position in 
defending itself by showing that the employee had received and understood the policy.  
Disciplining employees who engage in wrongdoing cannot be minimized.  In 
order to maintain the faith of the community in CCTV operations, government must be 
prepared to punish employees who act improperly.  Written policies qualify as the 
foundation for discipline since it is impossible to reinforce the mission if employees are 
unaware of how that mission is to be attained.  
A written policy should be drafted explaining the program’s goals; the procedures 
to reach those goals; an explanation detailing responsibilities for the chain of command; 
steps to take ensuring data protection, security and release of images; and the legal 
guidelines regulating video surveillance systems.  In order to avoid the pitfalls that 
confront surveillance system operators, the employees must understand the expectations 
of the system administrators.  Written policies clearly define those expectations. 
 
J. CCTV ADMINISTRATOR’S CHECKLIST 
1. Establish CCTV Exploration Committee 
• Include representatives from the police, homeland security, emergency 
management, academic, legal, political, business, civic, religious, civil 
liberties protection, technical field of video surveillance, etc. 
• Is video surveillance the best method to address the problem? 
• Determine if CCTV is the most effective/efficient method to address 
the problem? 
• Evaluate whether townwatch programs, improved lighting, curfew 
legislation, hardening of potential targets, integration of private 
security with public safety, restricting access to high risk locations, 
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redeployment of police resources, etc. would be better at addressing 
the problem 
• Identify other cities and agencies using CCTV and initiate contact to 
identify positives and negatives of those systems 
2. Decide Whether Sustainability will Become an Issue 
• How long will the commitment of personnel be able to be maintained? 
• How long will funding be able to be maintained? 
• How long will public and political support be maintained? 
3. Explore Funding Possibilities 
• Identify and apply for local, state and federal grants 
• Solicit corporate sponsors 
• Recruit organizations and community groups wishing coverage and 
willing to pay for equipment purchase and installation 
4. Develop Collaborative Operation 
• Involve utility providers, critical infrastructure locations, schools, high 
volume public areas, traffic control, crime suppression/detection, other 
city service agencies etc. 
5. Involve the Community 
• Consider introducing ballot question requesting permission to 
implement CCTV surveillance of public domain 
• Hold town meetings to introduce idea and garner support 
• Conduct an outreach effort to formal/informal organizations including 
business, civic, professional, educational, religious, political, labor etc. 
6. Locations for Cameras 
• Decide whether camera locations will be confidential or subject to full 
disclosure 
• Conduct longitudinal review of crime data 
• Utilize hazard analysis to identify high risk locations 
• Commit to locations that provide funding 
• Use consultant’s input to assist in identifying the most effective 
locations 
• Post signs notifying public in video surveillance areas 
7. Develop Registration and Licensing Process for Public Domain 
• Require private industry to answer the following questions: 
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• What will the system watch? 
• Who will be the system administrator? 
• Why does management feel surveillance system is necessary? 
• What is the coverage area? 
• What are the system capabilities? 
• How will abuse be prevented? 
• How long will images be retained? 
• What is the image release policy? 
• Establish regulations for private industry to adopt and provide to 
company’s seeking registration and licensing 
• Require yearly renewal that evaluates whether the need for 
surveillance still exists 
• Enable spot checks by government entity 
• Enable fines and system termination for violations 
8. Establish Procedure for Response to Suspicious or Illegal Behavior 
• Decide whether system will serve preventive or evidentiary purpose: 
• If preventive, system operators should have protocol regarding 
what to do for observations of suspicious or illegal behavior 
• If evidentiary, legal review should be conducted to determine if 
non-automated systems should follow preventive system protocols  
• If evidentiary, protocol for notifying police upon initiation of 
illegal behavior and method for transferring images to investigators 
9. Mechanize Operations 
• Consider utilizing cameras that automatically rotate 
• Consider utilizing software that conducts face recognition 
• Consider utilizing software that conducts license tag comparisons 
• Consider utilizing software that identifies and locates gunfire 
• Consider utilizing software that alerts system operators when traffic 
stops for extended periods of time or when items are left unattended in 
a public area 
• Consider utilizing software that alerts system operators when 
movement occurs in restricted or high threat areas 
• Consider utilizing software that blocks out windows, fenced-in yards, 
and special locations such as health clinics, etc. 
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10. Adequate Supervision 
• Ensure that a supervisor is always on duty whenever cameras are 
monitored by human operators 
• Restrict access to the video center and image storage location 
• Establish control log that documents the names and hours of personnel 
working each shift; names, times and purpose of entry into the center 
by non-assigned personnel; requests for images; and noteworthy 
incidents 
11. Confidentiality Agreement 
• Require all personnel assigned to any element of the surveillance 
system operation to review and sign a confidentiality agreement 
• Agreement should include a clause that the employee has received, 
reviewed and understands the department’s written policy regarding 
surveillance system operations 
• Agreement should include any laws specifically adopted to regulate 
surveillance system operations 
• Agreement should include the warning that violations will result in 
termination and possible civil/criminal action 
12. Chain of Custody for Images 
• Images should have electronic protection such as, watermarking or 
encryption 
• Images should be stored in secure location and any access to images 
should be recorded 
• Release of images should only occur upon written request through a 
designated chain of command 
• Release of images should be limited to: 
• assist in terrorism/criminal investigation 
• evidence indicating the commission of a crime  
• training for first responders 
13. Creation of Legislation 
• Engage lawmakers and guide in the establishment of legal standards 
for the operation of surveillance systems monitoring the public domain 
• Establish legislation with penalties for violations including 
imprisonment and fines 
• Restrict the release of images except as described above 
• Develop a minimum and maximum time frame for image retention 
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• Prohibit the interception of image transfer from wireless, intranet or 
other electronic platforms 
• If camera location confidentiality is determined to be necessary, 
establish legislation prohibiting the release of such information 
14. Training 
• Develop special training specifically for surveillance system 
operations 
• Training should be provided for all levels of system operations from 
technical personnel to administrator 
• Training should include Constitutional issues, case law, search and 
seizure regulations, state and local legislation, ethical considerations, 
and departmental policy 
• Training should occur prior to assignment in surveillance system 
operations and yearly to reinforce the importance of acceptable 
behavior 
15. Written Policy 
• Develop a written policy that clearly defines the mission of the 
surveillance system 
• Identify the system administrator responsible for all operational and 
administrative elements 
• Explain the system capabilities 
• Present parameters for system use, image retention and release, and 
access to video center and image storage location 
• Note the legal and departmental restrictions for surveillance system 
operations 
16. Publicity 
• In order to develop and establish the deterrence factor of behavior 
control, the news media should be a partner in reporting the 
implementation of the system and any subsequent success stories or 



























Homeland Security professionals appear to be nudging toward the United 
Kingdom’s model of public domain monitoring.  As we emulate the Panopticon vision 
for protecting urban areas, we must do so with concern for privacy expectations and with 
an eye on preventing abuse.  Our responsibility as protectors of society requires us to 
relentlessly pursue persons and organizations that threaten the safety of our citizens.  The 
zeal directed towards completing that task cannot overshadow the need to prevent the 
potential for abuse.  
As technology improves the ability of law enforcement to do more with less, 
consideration must be channeled towards ensuring we operate in a manner that protects 
our agency, our employees and our citizens.  Forging forward with reckless abandon by 
providing no written direction, no supervision, no training, and no regulating legislation 
creates a recipe for disaster.  
Staffed with intelligent and dedicated personnel, the homeland security discipline 
serves the nation in a manner unlike any other profession.  Eager to protect the United 
States, these committed people adopt new methods and technologies quickly.  It is 
unlikely that any other group of people is more intense about guaranteeing Americans 
their privacy while protecting them from danger.  Coupled with adequate controls, video 
surveillance systems represent a tremendous opportunity to exponentially multiply the 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
77 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Allen, Ronald J., Joseph L. Hoffman, Debra A. Livingston, and William J. Stuntz. 
Criminal Procedure. New York: Aspen Publishers, 2005. 
American Bar Association Standard 2-9.1(b). “Electronic Surveillance: Technologically-
Assisted Physical Surveillance.” Adopted 1998. 
Associated Press. “A Look at the New Orleans’ CCTV System.” 
http://www.securityinfowatch.com/article/article/jsp?id=3318&siteSection=427 
[Accessed April 17, 2005]. 
Associated Press. “Four surveillance camera operators at N.J. casino accused of ogling 
female patrons.” Associated Press New York, April 27, 2005. http://www.ap.org 
[Accessed August 2005]. 
Associated Press. “Step Up Surveillance, USA.” Wired News, July 24, 2005.   
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,68296,00.html (Accessed December 
10, 2005). 
Associated Press. “Three Arrested After Traffic Camera Aimed as (sic) Passersby.” 
WAFF 48 News, September 16, 2003. 
http://www.waff.com/Global/story/asp?S=1445080 [Accessed September 2005]. 
Bartol, Curt, and Anne M. Bartol. Delinquency and Justice. Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1998. 
Bay City News. “SF cop who reportedly ogled women is suspended for 9 months.” 
SFGate.com, April 21, 2005. http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/ 
baycitynews/archive/2005/04/21/cop21.DTL [Accessed June 2005]. 
Beddard, Ralph. “Photographs and the Rights of the Individual.” Modern Law Review 58, 
no. 6 (November 1995): 771-787.  
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies. CALEA Standards 
Manual    (2005). 
Cullen, Francis, and Robert Agnew. Criminological Theory. Los Angeles: Roxbury, 
2003. 
Curran, John. “Atlantic City casino fined for hidden cameras’ wandering eyes.” 
Associated Press New York, December 15, 2004. http://www.ap.org [Accessed 
December 2005]. 
Douglas, Merrill. “Parking Spotter.” Government Technology Magazine (June 27, 2005): 
65-72. 
Edwards, Phillip, and Nick Tilley. “Closed Circuit Television Looking Out For You.”  
Home Office Police Research Group (1995). http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk 
[Accessed April 2005]. 
78 
Gargis, Jon. “Strip traffic camera zooms in on bar-goers.” University of Alabama 
Crimson White, September 12, 2003. 
http://www.cw.ua.edu/vnews/display.v/art/2003/09/12/3f629e6e6a1fd?im_archive
=1 [Accessed June 2005]. 
Gras, Marianne L. “The Legal Regulation of CCTV in Europe.” Surveillance & Society 
(2004): 216-229. http://www.surveillance-and-
society.org/articles2(2)/regulation.pdf [Accessed May 2005]. 
Helten, Frank, and Bernd Fischer. “What Do People Think About CCTV? Findings From 
a Berlin Survey.” Berlin Institute for Social Research (February 2004): 12-18. 
Irish Independent. “Why there’s no magic shield against terror.” July 16, 2005. 
http://www.independent.co.uk [Accessed July 2005]. 
Kinzer, Stephen. “Chicago Moving to ‘Smart’ Surveillance Cameras.” New York Times, 
September 21, 2004, late edition, sec. A. 
Koskela, Hille. “‘Cam Era’-the contemporary urban Panopticon.” Surveillance & Society 
(2003): 292-313. http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles1(3)/camera/pdf 
[Accessed May 2005].  
Kyllo v. U.S., 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001). 
Light, Stephen. Understanding Criminal Justice. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 
1999.  
Livingston, Ikimulisa, and Philip Messing. “New York Police Seek Leak of Video.” 
Officer.com (April 1, 2004). 
http://www.officer/article.jsp?id=11339&siteSection=1 [Accessed June 2005]. 
Marshall, Patrick. “Privacy Under Attack.” Congressional Quarterly 11, no. 23 (June 15, 
2001): 511-520. 
McCahill, Michael, and Clive Norris. “CCTV in Britain.” Center for Criminology and 
Criminal Justice-University of Hull-United Kingdom (March 2002): 1-70. 
http://www.urbaneye.net [Accessed July 2005]. 
Mullen, Frank X. “UNR’s camera network raises fear.” Reno Gazette-Journal, March 13, 
2005, sec. 1A. http://news.rgj.com [Accessed July 2005].  
New York State Governor’s Press Releases. “Stephanie’s Law Creates Criminal Penalties 
for Covert Use of Viewing Devices on Unsuspecting Victims.” June 23, 2003. 
http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/03/june23_1_03.htm [Accessed June 2005]. 
New York Civil Liberties Union. “Surveillance Camera Project.” 
http://www.nyclu.org/surveillance_camera_main.html (Accessed December 10, 
2005). 
Ney, Steven, and Kurt Pichler. “Video Surveillance in Austria.” Urbaneye Project (April 
2002). http://www.urbaneye.net  [Accessed July 2005]. 
79 
Nieto, Marcus, Kimberly Johnston-Dodds, and Charlene Wear Simmons. “Public and 
Private Applications of Video Surveillance and Biometric Technologies.” 
California Research Bureau (CRB 02-006 2002): 1-67. 
http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/02/06/02-006.pdf [Accessed August 2005]. 
Nieto, Marcus. “Public Video Surveillance: Is It An Effective Crime Prevention Tool?” 
California Research Bureau (1997): 1-45. 
http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/05/crb97-005.pdf [Accessed August 2005].  
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology. “CCTV.” Postnote no. 175 (April 
2002): 1-4. http://www.parliament.uk/post/pn175.pdf [Accessed June 2005]. 
PoliceOne.com. “Chicago Moving to ‘Smart’ Surveillance Cameras.” (September 22, 
2004). http://www.policeone/policeone/frontend/parser.cfm?object= 
News&operation=fullnews&id=92023 [Accessed July 2005].       
Reid, Tim. “US surveillance will track every car.” Times (London), July 3, 2003. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030703-car-surveillance01.htm 
[Accessed August 2005]. 
Ruegg, Jean, Valerie November, and Francisco Klauser. “CCTV, Risk Management and 
Regulation Mechanisms in Publicly-Used Places: A Discussion Based on Swiss 
Examples.” Surveillance & Society (2004): 415-429. http://www.surveillance-
and-society.org/cctv.htm [Accessed May 2005]. 
Saetnan, Ann Rudinow, Johanne Yttri Dahl, and Heidi Mork Lomell. “Views from under 
surveillance. Public opinion in a closely watched area in Oslo.” Urbaneye Project 
(January 2004). http://www.urbaneye.net [Accessed May 2005]. 
Sheptycki, James. “Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television and Social Control.” Policing 
and Society 9 (2000): 430-436. 
Sonner, Scott. “Nevada researcher alleges university police falsely reported homeland 
security concerns.” Associated Press New York, April 23, 2005. 
http://www.ap.org [Accessed July 2005].     
Stearns, John. “2 at casino fired for breast photos dealers, customers pictured.” Arizona 
Republic, June 5, 2004, sec. B1. http://www.azcentral.com/news/ [Accessed 
August 2005]. 
Surveillance Camera Players. “Maps of Publicly Installed Surveillance Cameras in New 
York City.” http://www.notbored.org/scp-maps.html [Accessed December 10, 
2005]. 
Surveillance Camera Players. “Who we are & why we’re here.” 
http://www.notbored.org/generic.ipg [Accessed December 10, 2005]. 
Topfer, Eric, Leon Hampel and Heather Cameron. “Watching the Bear.” Urbaneye 
Project (December 2003). http://www.urbaneye.net [Accessed July 2005]. 
TX Stat. Ann. Sec. 418.182 as amended by House Bill 9. 
80 
Wallace, Sarah. “NYPD Housing Surveillance Staffed by Cops Under Investigation.” 
Officer.com (April 23, 2004). http://www.officer.com/article/article.jsp?id= 
1207&siteSection=1 [Accessed August 2005]. 
Wardle, Amanda. “Company denies charges.” Nashville City Paper, August 1, 2003 
http://www.nashvillecitypaper.com/index.cfm?section_id=9&screen=news&news
_id=25248 [Accessed December 10, 2005].  
Welsh, Brandon C., and David P. Farrington. “Effects of Closed Circuit Television 
Surveillance on Crime: Protocol for a Systematic Review.” Campbell 
Collaboration Crime and Justice Group (2003): 1-12. 
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/doc-pdf/cctv.pdf [Accessed June 2005].  
Wiecek, Carsten, and Ann Rudinow Saetnan. “Restrictive? Permissive? The 
Contradictory Framing of Video Surveillance in Norway and Denmark.” 
Urbaneye Project (March 2002). http://www.urbaneye.net [Accessed July 2005]. 
Williams, Katherine, and Craig Johnstone. “The Politics of the Selective Gaze: Closed 
Circuit Television and the Policing of Public Space.” Crime, Law & Social 
Change (September 2000): 183-210. 
Wilson, Dean, and Dr. Adam Sutton. “Open-Street CCTV in Australia: A Comparative 
Study of Establishment and Operation.” A Report to the Criminology Research 
Council (November 2003): 1-6.  
Woodward, John D. “Privacy vs. Security: Electronic Surveillance in the Nation’s 
Capital.” RAND Corporation (CT-194 2002): 1-11. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/ct194/index.html [Accessed August 2005].  
Zurawski, Nils. “I Know Where You Live!-Aspects of Watching, Surveillance and Social 
Control in a Conflict Zone.” Surveillance & Society (2005): 498-512.          
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles2(4)/ni.pdf [Accessed September 
2005].  
81 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
